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“Intelligence” Searches and
Purpose: A Significant Mismatch
Between Constitutional Criminal
Procedure and the Law of
Intelligence-Gathering
Robert C. Power
Hassan Abu-Jihaad, a United States citizen who served in
the U.S. Navy for about four years, was indicted in 2007 for
providing information to a terrorist group via email and the
internet.1 In particular, Abu-Jihaad was charged with sending
classified information about a U.S. Navy Battle Group
scheduled for deployment in the Persian Gulf region in 2001.2
Separate counts charged providing material support to a
conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals and communicating national
defense information to persons not entitled to receive it.3
While the charges were pending, the government filed
notice of its intention to use evidence derived from national
security electronic surveillance.4 Abu-Jihaad‘s counsel moved
Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development and Professor of
Law, Widener University School of Law. Dean Power thanks John Dernbach,
Andrea Nappi, Ed Sonnenberg, and Bonnie Lerner for their help in
researching and writing this article. Power served as the H. Albert Young
Fellow in Constitutional Law from 2007 to 2009 and thanks the Young
Foundation and the Young family for their support of this article and several
other research projects on constitutional law and human rights.
1. Indictment, United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 2007 WL 4961131, at ¶¶ 1,
12-27 (D. Conn. Mar. 5, 2008) (No. 07CR57), 2007 WL 4961131.
2. Id. ¶¶ 21, 25, 31.
3. Id. ¶¶ 28-31. The providing material support count was charged
under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006), id. ¶ 29, and the communicating national
defense information count was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (2006), id. ¶
31.
4. Amended Notice of Intention to Use Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act Information Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1825(d), United States v.
Abu-Jihaad, 2008 WL 676037 (D. Conn. Mar. 5, 2008) (No.07CR57). See
Motion to Suppress FISA Derived Evidence, United States v. Abu-Jihaad,
2008 WL 676037 (D. Conn. Mar. 5, 2008) (No. 07CR57), 2007 WL 4961126, at
¶ 2 (discussing the Government‘s Motion).
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to suppress that evidence but found his hands tied because he
was not permitted to view either the legal documents in
support of the government‘s electronic surveillance application
or the orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(―FISC‖) issued in reliance on those documents.5 The defense
motion was in some respects similar to shadowboxing, as
arguments were necessarily presented on the basis of
assumptions and guesses about the nature of the government‘s
investigation and the strength of its case against Abu-Jihaad
and his unindicted co-conspirators.6 The trial judge denied
Abu-Jihaad‘s request for information about the surveillance,
examined the documents in camera, and upheld the use of the
evidence in the criminal trial.7 Abu-Jihaad was convicted of
both charges in 2008.8 In 2009, the judge upheld the conviction
for providing classified information and granted a judgment of
acquittal on the material support charge.9
Several years before Abu-Jihaad‘s conviction, FBI agents
assisting Spanish authorities who were themselves
investigating the March 2004 Madrid train-bombing, focused
attention on an Oregon attorney, Brandon Mayfield.10 A
fingerprint was recovered on items used in the bombing, and
FBI analysis determined it to be similar to 20 fingerprints
which the FBI had on file in its Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (―AFIS‖).11 Mayfield‘s ―adherence to the

5. Motion to Suppress FISA Derived Evidence, supra note 4, at ¶ 3. See
also infra note 80 (discussing the FISC).
6. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress FISA Derived
Evidence, United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 2008 WL 676037 (D. Conn. Mar. 5,
2008) (No 07CR57), 2007 WL 4961127. For example, counsel tried to make
an argument under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), that the
government‘s applications contained false information about the classified
nature of some of the information in question, but was unable to point to
specific assertions in the applications and argue that they were recklessly
false. Id.
7. United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301 (D. Conn.
2008).
8. Jury Verdict, United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 2008 WL 676037 (D. Conn.
Mar. 5, 2008).
9. United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 600 F. Supp. 2d 362, 365 (D. Conn.
2009).
10. See Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1027 (D. Or.
2007), vacated, 588 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2009).
11. Id.
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Muslim faith,‖12 led the FBI to conduct electronic surveillance
at Mayfield‘s home and law office, and to execute surreptitious
searches of both locations.13 Mayfield was later subjected to
material witness proceedings, arrest, incommunicado custody,
and pressure to confess.14 The fingerprint was later matched to
an Algerian man who was apparently involved in the terrorist
bombings, and Mayfield was exonerated.15
Mayfield was far more fortunate than Abu-Jihaad. His
custody was short, and he received a substantial settlement for
most of his claims against the government.16 Still, United
States citizens suspected of terrorist activities, or even
involvement with foreign organizations, can take little comfort
from this story.17 The settlement did not resolve Mayfield‘s
12. Id. at 1027.
13. Id. at 1029.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1026. See, e.g., Ryan Geddes, Mayfield Settles Case Against
Feds for $2 Million, BEAVERTON VALLEY TIMES, Nov. 29, 2006, available at
http://www.beavertonvalleytimes.com/news/story.php?story_id=11648268729
1016800; Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Will Pay $2 Million to Lawyer Wrongly Jailed,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at A18; Henry Schuster & Terry Frieden, Lawyer
Wrongly Arrested in Bombings: 'We lived in 1984', CNN.COM, Nov. 30, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/11/29/mayfield.suit/index.html.
17. There are obviously many other intriguing stories about the
treatment of U.S. citizens and others in the United States and elsewhere
during the war on terrorism. One intriguing story involved Cyrus Kar, who
was taken into custody by the United States military in Iraq in 2005. See
Kar v. Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80, 81-82 (D.D.C. 2008). An American
citizen working on a documentary film, Kar and his Iraqi cameraman were
traveling in a Baghdad taxi when they were stopped by Iraqi police. Id. at
81. Kar was promptly transferred to U.S. military custody, where he was
held for over seven weeks, most of that time in solitary confinement, in harsh
conditions, at a military detention center. Id. at 82. At one point Kar was
interrogated by an FBI agent. Id. According to the district court‘s written
opinion in Kar‘s civil case against the government, ―[w]hen he asked the
agent if he could speak with an attorney, the agent laughed and replied that
none were available. The agent added that Kar had the right to remain
silent, but he said that the last person to exercise that right was still being
detained in Afghanistan two years later.‖ Id. Kar agreed to talk, submitted
to a polygraph examination, and consented to a search of his home in
California. Id. A status hearing pursuant to the Geneva Conventions was
held on short notice. Id. The hearing officers concluded that Kar was
innocent, and he was released six days later. Id. at 82-83. A federal district
court later dismissed a damages action that Kar brought against the
government, largely on the basis of qualified immunity. Id. at 86. While the
court concluded that, as a United States citizen, Kar was protected by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments—even while abroad in a war zone—and that
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claim that an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (―FISA‖)18 violated the Fourth Amendment.19
Related arguments claimed that covert physical searches
authorized by amendments to FISA similarly violated the
Mayfield prevailed in the district
Fourth Amendment.20
21
court, but most other challengers to those provisions have
failed, including Abu-Jihaad.22 As a result, even American
citizens in the United States are likely to remain subject to
tactics more conducive to war than to criminal investigation.
This is true, even though, as in Mayfield and possibly in AbuJihaad, the government is investigating a past criminal act.
Moreover, even if the courts reverse direction and follow the
Mayfield court‘s approach, victims will not be remedied until
their rights are clearly established,23 something that is not
he had been denied some of those rights by this treatment, those rights were
not clearly established in law, and therefore, the court could not support an
award of damages. Id. at 84-86. The court‘s ruling illustrates some of the
difficulties of enforcing constitutional rights abroad and during wartime.
While the court in Kar concluded that the initial arrest and detention were
lawful under war conditions, but that the delay of forty-eight days from Kar‘s
arrest to his probable cause hearing exceeded constitutional limits, the court
was unable to conclude that there had been a violation of a clearly
established right to a prompt probable cause hearing under combat
conditions. Id. at 84-85. The result of the case was judicial recognition that,
even for a United States citizen arrested several years into the occupation of
Iraq, nothing resembling the rights recognized in the criminal justice system
could legitimately be imposed on the military‘s efforts to conduct the war on
terror within a war zone.
18. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
19. See Mayfield, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1030.
20. Id. at 1030-33 (discussing the United and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, § 218, 115 Stat. 272,
291 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823). Mayfield argued that
the USA-PATRIOT Act‘s FISA amendments allow the government to ―avoid
the Fourth Amendment‘s probable cause requirement when conducting
surveillance or searches of a criminal suspect‘s home or office merely by
asserting a desire to also gather foreign intelligence information from the
person whom the government intends to criminally prosecute.‖ Id. at 1032.
21. Id. at 1042-43. The decision, however, was vacated and remanded by
the Ninth Circuit due to Mayfield‘s lack of standing. Mayfield v. United
States, 588 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2009).
22. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299, 304 (D. Conn.
2008) (expressly rejecting the holding in Mayfield).
23. A major obstacle to civil relief for claims of Fourth Amendment
violations in this arena is the fact that qualified immunity will prevent
recovery unless the right is clearly established at the time the alleged
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even on the horizon nearly a decade after the beginning of the
War on Terror.
The last twenty years have seen a dramatic expansion of
military and civilian efforts against international terrorism.
Every few years, legislation has tweaked the federal criminal
code or intelligence laws to make it easier to identify and
incarcerate terrorists. Much of this legislation has been
appropriate, especially in light of new technology that has
made it more difficult to collect intelligence and evidence
against foreign agents. Other legislative acts, however, have
created more problems than they seem to have solved.
President George W. Bush‘s first Attorney General, John
Ashcroft, announced the ―New Paradigm‖ soon after September
11, 2001.24 This was a change in the Department of Justice‘s
(―DOJ‖) mission from prosecution of criminals to prevention of
terrorism.25 In the name of anti-terrorism, many of the Bush
administration‘s efforts expanded law enforcement‘s powers to
act.
The constitutional doctrine that existed prior to this shift
in emphasis may not be enough to protect the public as the
founders had intended. While some judicial decisions and legal
trends are responsive to expanded government powers, such as
the extraterritorial application of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights, others are less so. This would include the apparent

violation occurred. See Kar v. Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80, 83-84 (D.D.C.
2008) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 583 U.S. 174, 201 (2001)).
24. See JOHN ASHCROFT, NEVER AGAIN: SERVING AMERICA AND RESTORING
JUSTICE 124-26, 133 (2006) (describing a need for new infrastructure and a
culture of preventing terrorism rather than prosecuting terrorist crimes). See
also infra note 25.
25. John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, Speech before
Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 10, 2003), http://usinfo.org/wfarchive/2003/030210/epf116.htm (―In order to fight and to defeat terrorism,
the Department of Justice has added a new paradigm to that of prosecution—
a paradigm of prevention.‖). See also JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 33 (2008);
David Cole, Are We Safer?, 53 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 4 (2006),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18752 (reviewing DANIEL BENJAMIN &
STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE FAILURE OF THE WAR ON TERROR AND A
STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT (2006)) (―Within the US, Attorney General
John Ashcroft repeatedly promoted what he labeled a new ‗paradigm of
prevention‘ in law enforcement.‖); Tillie Fong, Ashcroft Defends the Patriot
Act,
ROCKYMOUNTAINNEWS.COM,
Nov.
28,
2007,
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2007/nov/28/ashcroft-defends-thepatriot-act/.

5

2010] “INTELLIGENCE” SEARCHES AND PURPOSE

625

green light that Congress has given the government to use
intelligence tools to investigate criminal activity, as identified
in Mayfield.26
This Article addresses the role of constitutional criminal
procedure in national security investigations, focusing on the
role of government‘s purpose in taking action. This is the key
question, given Ashcroft‘s redirection of the Department of
Justice. The same tools are used in both criminal and
intelligence investigations. If the government searches a home
or conducts electronic surveillance, it intrudes on the same
privacy interests and learns the same type of data—physical
evidence that is located in the home or words that are spoken
in the vicinity of a microphone.
What differs is the
government‘s purpose—the reason for taking the action.
Purpose inquiries are critical to this issue because it is the
purpose of the investigation that determines the applicable
law. Here, a subtle part of the USA-PATRIOT Act and its
amendments to FISA have had a major impact, as considered
by the courts in Abu-Jihaad and Mayfield. This Article
therefore examines FISA, with particular attention to the 2001
amendments, to determine if the distinction between a criminal
investigatory purpose and a foreign intelligence purpose can
and should be dispositive of Fourth Amendment issues. Most
courts have concluded that the change was appropriate, but
this Article argues that, under a totality of the circumstances
approach consistent with Fourth Amendment analysis
generally, the courts have overlooked both the significance of
the change and the fact that it has created an easy road to
conduct extraordinarily intrusive warrantless searches without
probable cause. It would be too strong to say that the 2001
amendments were a paving stone on the road to the hell of a
police state—but it would not be too much to say that they
permit the government to play bait-and-switch with the courts
in a fashion that denigrates constitutional rights without any
apparent gain in serving national security.

26. See 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1027.
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I. FISA and the Expansion of National Security Surveillance
A. The Landscape in 1978
The central legal authority concerning intelligence
collection is FISA, which was enacted in 1978.27 FISA was
passed following Senate hearings on abusive practices in the
United States and abroad by the CIA.28 The hearings fed a
national belief that executive discretion in the field of
intelligence required greater oversight. FISA was also, in large
part, a response to the Supreme Court‘s decision in United
Keith
States v. United States District Court (Keith).29
presented the executive branch with a mandate to conform its
domestic actions to the Fourth Amendment.30
1. Keith
The Keith decision involved the warrantless electronic
surveillance of Robert Plamondon, a defendant in a federal
prosecution of radicals for destruction of government
property.31 The government acknowledged that Plamondon
27. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
28. The Senate Report to FISA referred at length to the abuses
uncovered in Senate hearings chaired by Frank Church of Idaho and to the
case law of the time, including Keith. S. REP. NO. 95-604 (pt. I), at 7-15
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908-16. For a good history of
intelligence actions by United States agencies, including the CIA leading up
to the Church Committee hearings, see Seth Kreimer, Watching the
Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency, and Political Freedom in the War on
Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133 (2004). See also generally Richard Henry
Seamon, Domestic Surveillance For International Terrorists: Presidential
Power and Fourth Amendment Limits, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 449 (2008)
(placing unilateral executive actions in historical and constitutional
perspective); James G. McAdams III, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA): An Overview, U.S. DEP‘T OF HOMELAND SEC., March 2007,
http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-andfaqs/articles/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act.html/.
29. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297
(1972). All justices participating in the decision agreed with the outcome.
Justice Rehnquist, who had recently served in the Department of Justice,
recused himself.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 299. Keith is addressed in several recent articles on FISA and
related issues. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, International Crime and Terrorism:
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had been subject to warrantless electronic surveillance, but
argued that it was authorized by Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act (―Title III‖),32 which regulated federal and
state use of electronic surveillance.33 The technical issue was
whether language in Title III that indicated that the statute
did not limit any presidential power to protect national security
had the effect of giving the President the power to conduct
electronic surveillance directed against domestic groups that
advocated violence against the government.34 The Court
concluded that ―Congress simply left presidential powers where
it found them,‖35 neither adding to them, as argued by the
government, nor taking away from them.36 This was, in
essence, a decision based on plain-meaning statutory
interpretation. The Court stressed the limits of its analysis,
The Bush Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Fourth
Amendment’s Warrant Requirement: Lessons From Justice Powell and the
Keith Case, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1259, 1279-92 (2008); Dan Fenske,
Comment, All Enemies, Foreign and Domestic: Erasing the Distinction
Between Foreign and Domestic Intelligence Gathering Under the Fourth
Amendment, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 353-55 (2008). For contemporary
readings of Keith, see United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 601-02 (3d Cir.
1973); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1973).
32. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (1968) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006)).
33. Keith, 407 U.S. at 300.
34. The language in question stated:
Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual
or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power,
to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential
to the security of the United States, or to protect national
security information against foreign intelligence activities.
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such
measures as he deems necessary to protect the United
States against the overthrow of the Government by force or
other unlawful means, or against any other clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of the
Government.
82 Stat. at 214, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970), repealed by Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1783, 1797.
35. Keith, 407 U.S. at 303.
36. Id. at 302-08.
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noting that the case did not concern the President‘s powers
concerning foreign actions occurring ―within or without this
country.‖37
The opinion was classic ―Justice Powell‖:38 it was cautious,
it tried to follow a middle course, and it purported to be factbound even as it discussed side or unnecessary issues. The
discussion of presidential power led to a discussion of
legitimate concerns about electronic surveillance and the
important role that the Fourth Amendment plays due to the
substantial impact that electronic surveillance has on
privacy.39 This typical judicial balancing of legitimate public
values against the impact on civil liberties then led to the
Court‘s explanation of why a warrant requirement is
constitutionally required: ―These fourth amendment freedoms
cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security
surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of
the Executive Branch.‖40
The Court addressed the question of the purpose of a
government search for intelligence information in an
unremarkable discussion of arguably applicable Fourth
Amendment exceptions. The Court described the purpose of
the electronic surveillance directed at Plamondon as ―the
37. Id. at 308. The Court both confronted the fact that all post-World
War II presidents had asserted the power to use electronic surveillance
against domestic subversives, and it recognized the value of electronic
surveillance to legitimate government investigations. Id. at 310-11 & n.10.
38. Justice Powell‘s attempt to forge a path between constitutional
absolutes is acknowledged in numerous commentaries. See, e.g., Paul R.
Baier, Of Bakke’s Balance, Gratz and Grutter: The Voice of Justice Powell, 78
TUL. L. REV. 1955 (2004); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the
Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987);
Craig Evan Klafter, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: A Pragmatic Relativist, 8
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (1998); Sandra Day O‘Connor, A Tribute to Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 395 (1987); Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F.
Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1854 (1995).
39. Keith, 407 U.S. at 312-13. The opinion also notes the fact that
national security cases tend to challenge First Amendment values, as the line
between legitimate political dissent and illegitimate political subversion is
vague. Id. at 313. This concern became codified in FISA. See infra note 85.
40. Id. at 316-17. As in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
which was then and is still today, the central decision on the meaning of
―search‖ under the Fourth Amendment, the Court noted that the electronic
surveillance conducted against Plamondon might have been reasonable under
the facts, but that this was not sufficient—prior judicial authorization was
required under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 317-18.
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collecting and maintaining of intelligence with respect to
subversive forces, and . . . not an attempt to gather evidence for
specific criminal prosecutions.‖41
The Court rejected the
government‘s argument that this motivation either rendered
the Fourth Amendment inapplicable or permitted unilateral
executive branch action.42 The Court‘s reasoning provided
some direction for resolving present-day problems. ―Official
surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or
ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement of
Thus, an
constitutionally protected privacy of speech.‖43
intelligence, rather than a law enforcement purpose, did not
convince eight justices in 1972 that a non-law enforcement
purpose—even such a compelling one as preventing violence by
subversive groups—was sufficient to justify doing away with
traditional Fourth Amendment protections.
Keith necessarily left gaps in the constitutional law of
intelligence-gathering. First, and most obviously, the warrant
requirement it imposed did not extend, at least on its own
terms, to cases involving foreign intelligence. The opinion
ended by reiterating that the warrant requirement applied only
to ―domestic aspects of national security,‖ without fully
defining the category, other than to state that the ruling did
not apply to ―foreign powers or their agents.‖44 Second, the
opinion emphasized that electronic surveillance for domestic
intelligence might be appropriate under different standards
than those that apply to criminal law enforcement, noting both
its own use of constitutional interest balancing for non-law
enforcement searches, as well as the propriety of congressional
action to establish reasonable standards.45 Thus, Keith seemed
41. Id. at 318-19.
42. Id. at 319-20.
43. Id. at 320. The Court concluded that courts are sufficiently
knowledgeable about national security and are not too insecure to handle
such important matters. Id. It characterized the adverse impact on the
executive branch of a warrant requirement as simply a minor added
―inconvenience.‖ Id. at 321.
44. Id. at 321-22 & n.20.
45. Id. at 322-23. The Court specifically quoted Camara v. Municipal
Court, which had applied the Fourth Amendment‘s warrant clause to
administrative inspections, and which had utilized justifications that were
different in kind and degree from probable cause. Id. at 323 (quoting Camara
v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)). This can be seen as an early
reference to the category that later became known as ―special needs‖
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to acknowledge the existence of three categories of searches:
criminal law enforcement searches, including electronic
surveillance as authorized by Title III;46 foreign intelligence
searches, which might be immune from the warrant
requirement and which were (then) ungoverned by federal
statutory law;47 and domestic intelligence searches, such as
that which was directed at Plamondon, and which were fully
subject to the Fourth Amendment.48 At least in the absence of
statutory provisions authorizing domestic security searches
and electronic surveillance, presumably the traditional Fourth
Amendment requirements applied to such searches.
Several lower courts decided in the 1970s to accept the
Keith Court‘s invitation to recognize a presidential power to
conduct searches against ―foreign powers.‖49 Although the
Supreme Court never accepted any of these decisions for
review, it is fair to conclude that the general approval of this
theory represented a consensus that ―foreign intelligence‖ cases
were different, although there was no uniform understanding
of all of the defining factors differentiating domestic from
foreign cases. This became relatively unimportant because
FISA was enacted in 1978, and it became the primary
authority, rather than the negative-pregnant implications of
the Keith decision. Still, one case involving pre-FISA electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes is worth
discussing, both because it has received substantial attention
over the years and because it seems to be the origin of the key
factor in differentiating foreign intelligence searches from other
searches—the primary purpose test.
United States v. Truong, decided in 1980, after FISA had
been enacted, concerned electronic surveillance and physical
searches. See infra Part II(A).
46. 407 U.S. at 306.
47. See id. at 308-09.
48. See id. at 321-22.
49. See, e.g., Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 575-77 (E.D. Mich.
1979), vacated, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983);
United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 890 (1977); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593,
602-06 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). But cf. Chagnon v.
Bell, 642 F.2d 1248, 1259 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 911
(1981) (noting that prior decisions invalidating domestic intelligence
operations did not invalidate foreign intelligence operations).
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searches that had been conducted in 1977 and 1978, prior to
the final congressional action on FISA.50 The case addressed
several months of electronic surveillance of Truong‘s telephone
and his apartment, all conducted without court authorization.51
The Fourth Circuit upheld the lower court‘s decision to admit
evidence from the first several weeks of the electronic
Warrantless
surveillance, but it suppressed the rest.52
electronic surveillance during the first time period was
permissible because the court agreed that there was inherent
executive power to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance.53
At least two limitations served to prevent executive abuse of its
powers in this area. First, the court limited the power to
conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to situations where
―the object of the search or the surveillance is a foreign power,
its agent or collaborators.‖54 Second, the court affirmed the
district court‘s conclusion that the executive power extends
only so long as ―the surveillance is conducted ‗primarily‘ for
foreign intelligence reasons.‖55 This distinction was rooted in
both competency and theoretical reasons: courts, rather than
administrative officials, are the experts and appropriate bodies
to evaluate the justification for criminal investigative
techniques.56 At the same time, privacy concerns typical of
Fourth Amendment analysis eclipse international policy
concerns once the government is working toward a criminal
prosecution.57 The court did not try to split the hairs any more
finely—a search was either primarily intelligence or primarily
criminal, and this categorization would determine the
appropriate standards for authorization. In a brief concluding
50. United States v. Dinh Hung (Truong), 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
51. Id. at 912.
52. Id. at 913, 931.
53. The court interpreted Keith as acknowledging executive power in
this realm, finding that the policies the Supreme Court held not to be
prevailing in the arena of domestic intelligence were sufficiently convincing
in the area of foreign intelligence. Id. at 913-15. These policies include
executive expertise in international relations and the relative lack of
knowledge by judges. Id. at 913-14.
54. Id. at 915.
55. Id.
56. Here the court, to some extent, jumps to the conclusion that probable
cause is the key factor once a search occurs in a criminal investigation. See
id.
57. Id.
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section that provided guidance for later developments, the
court addressed the facts indicating the shift in the Truong
investigation. Prior to July 20, 1977, the matter had been an
At that time, however, the
intelligence investigation.58
Criminal Division of the Justice Department clearly took
charge of the investigation as it began to structure a criminal
prosecution.59 Thus, in the case that most fully considered the
scope of governmental powers concerning foreign intelligence
prior to FISA, the purpose of the search or surveillance was the
critical factor in determining the applicable law.
2. FISA
FISA largely tracked the Keith and Truong analysis by
providing a legal structure for several different varieties of
electronic surveillance.60 Some forms of electronic surveillance
were to remain exempt from judicial oversight. Thus, Section
102 of the FISA statute provided generally that the President
could authorize electronic surveillance without a court order
when the surveillance is directed at communications of foreign
powers and ―there is no substantial likelihood‖ of intercepting
the communications of any United States citizen or permanent
resident.61 The several definitions of ―electronic surveillance‖
58. See id. at 915.
59. Id. at 916.
60. Numerous articles detail FISA and its history. See, e.g., Adam
Burton, Fixing FISA For Long War: Regulating Warrantless Surveillance in
the Age of Terrorism, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 381, 386-89 (2006); Beryl A. Howell &
Dana J. Lesemann, FISA’s Fruits in Criminal Cases: An Opportunity For
Improved Accountability, 12 UCLA J. INT‘L L. & FOREIGN AFF., 145, 147-51
(2007); Richard Henry Seamon, Domestic Surveillance For International
Terrorists: Presidential Power and Fourth Amendment Limits, 35 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 449 (2008); William Pollack, Note, Shu’ubiyya or Security?
Preserving Civil Liberties by Limiting FISA Evidence to National Security
Prosecutions, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 221, 224-31 (2008). See also supra
note 28.
61. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through
the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance
without a court order . . . to acquire foreign intelligence
information for periods of up to one year if the Attorney
General certifies in writing under oath that . . .
(A) the electronic surveillance is solely directed at . . . (i)
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also limited the application of the judicial authorization
provisions of the statute.62 Consistent with the technology of
the period and the model provided by Title III, the law
generally covered the acquisition of the contents of
conversations when they involved United States persons,
international communications with one end in the United
States, or where the act of acquisition took place in the United
States.63 This made the law partially extra-territorial in effect,
the acquisition of the contents of communications
transmitted by means of communications used exclusively
between or among foreign powers, . . .or (ii) the acquisition
of technical intelligence, other than the spoken
communications of individuals, from property or premises
under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power . . .
(B) there is no substantial likelihood that the
surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication
to which a United States person is a party; and
(C) [adequate minimization procedures are followed].
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §
102(a)(1)(A)-(C), 92 Stat. 1783, 1786-87 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A)(C) (2006)). The section also includes requirements that the Justice
Department report to the Chief Justice and pertinent House and Senate
committees. See id. § 102(a)(1)-(3), 92 Stat. at 1786-87.
62. Id. § 101(f)(1)-(3), 92 Stat. at 1785 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1)(3) (2006)).
63. The statute defines the term ―electronic surveillance‖ as:
(1) the acquisition by an electronic . . . device of the
contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or
intended to be received by a particular, known United
States person who is in the United States, if the contents
are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States
person, under circumstances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic . . . device of the
contents of any wire communication to or from a person in
the United States, without the consent of any party thereto,
if such acquisition occurs in the United States . . .
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic . . . device
of the contents of any radio communication, under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all
intended recipients are located within the United States . . .
.
Id.
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a fact noted in the Senate Report.64 The definition of ―foreign
power‖ begins by tracking conventional usage to include foreign
governments, factions, or foreign-based political organizations,
but also includes international terrorism, defined as violent or
otherwise dangerous actions that are both violations of
criminal law and intended to intimidate governments or
Another central definition concerns ―foreign
civilians.65
intelligence information,‖ which is defined in two respects. The
information must relate to the nation‘s ability to protect itself
from attack, sabotage, international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence by foreign entities.66 Alternatively, and far more
generally, if a foreign power is involved, the information must
relate to national defense or security or the conduct of foreign
64. See S. REP. NO. 95-604 (pt. I) at 40 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3942.
65. The statute includes as a definition of ―foreign power,‖ ―a group
engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.‖
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 101(a)(4),
92 Stat. 1783, 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (2006)). The statute
also defines ―international terrorism‖ as activities that:
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States
or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or
any State;
(2) appear to be intended . . . (A) to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; (B) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (C) to affect the
conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping;
and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend
national boundaries . . . .
Id. § 101(c)(1)-(3), 92 Stat. at 1784 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(1)-(3)
(2006)).
66. Id. § 101(e)(1), 92 Stat. at 1784 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)
(2006)). The statute states that ―foreign intelligence information‖ includes:
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United
States person is necessary to protect against . . . (A) actual
or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign
power; (B) sabotage [or] international terrorism . . . by a
foreign power . . . ; or (C) clandestine intelligence activities
by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power . . .
Id.
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affairs.67 In both aspects, if the information concerns a United
States person, then the information must be ―necessary‖ to the
ability to protect national defense, security, or foreign affairs.68
The emphasis on protection for U.S. citizens and resident
aliens from unjustified intrusion is a recurring theme in the
statute and its legislative history.69
With respect to electronic surveillance of covered
individuals for intelligence purposes, the law requires judicial
permission somewhat analogous to the electronic surveillance
warrants governed by Title III for traditional criminal activity.
The first of two key provisions regulating use of electronic
surveillance with court involvement was included in Section
104 of FISA.70 This provision includes numerous requirements
for applications for court orders approving electronic
surveillance.
The central requirements are that the
application include the facts supporting the conclusion that the
target of the electronic surveillance is ―a foreign agent or an
agent of a foreign power‖ and that the facilities subject to the
surveillance are used by a foreign power,71 as well as ―a
detailed description of the nature of the information sought‖72
and a series of certifications by senior executive officials.73
These certifications relate to the conclusion that the
67. Id. § 101(e)(2), 92 Stat. at 1785 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)
(2006)) (stating that foreign intelligence information also includes:
―information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates
to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to . . . (A) the
national defense or security of the United States; or (B) the conduct of the
foreign affairs of the United States‖).
68. See id. § 101(e)(1)-(2), 92 Stat. at 1784-85 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1801(e)(1)-(2) (2006)) (each using the word ―necessary‖).
69. See, e.g., id. § 101(b), (e), (f), (h), 92 Stat. at 1783-86 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1801(b), (e), (f), (n) (2006)) (definitions dependent on whether person
in question is a U.S. person). See also S. REP. NO. 95-604 (pt. I) at 40
(discussing the definition of ―United States person‖ and noting controversies
about the limited protections accorded to other persons).
70. See id. § 104, 92 Stat. at 1788-90 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §
1804 (2006)).
71. Id. § 104(a)(4), 92 Stat. at 1788-89 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
1804(a)(3) (2006)).
72. Id. § 104(a)(6), 92 Stat. at 1789 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
1804(a)(5) (2006)). The current version of the statute no longer requires that
the description be ―detailed.‖
73. Id. § 104(a)(7), 92 Stat. at 1789 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
1804(a)(6) (2006)).
Again, the ―foreign power‖ category now includes
participants in international terrorism.
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information is ―foreign intelligence information,‖74 describing
the appropriate statutory category,75 and the basis for the
certifications.76 In the initial version of FISA, a required
certification was that ―the purpose of the surveillance‖ was to
In the USAobtain foreign intelligence information.77
PATRIOT Act, Congress amended this required certification to
require that ―a significant purpose of the surveillance‖ be to
obtain foreign intelligence information.78 This subtle language
distinction belies the substantial political and legal controversy
concerning the purpose distinction between criminal
investigation and foreign intelligence.
The second key provision regulating use of electronic
surveillance with court involvement was Section 105 of FISA,
or the ―Issuance of order‖ provision.79 This provision requires
that the judge80 make a series of findings concerning: proper
authorization of the application within the Department of
Justice,81 probable cause,82 minimization,83 and compliance
with all certification requirements.84 The probable cause
74. Id. § 104(a)(7)(A), 92 Stat. 1789 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
1804(a)(6)(A) (2006)).
75. Id. § 104(a)(7)(D), 92 Stat. 1789 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
1804(a)(6)(D) (2006)).
76. Id. § 104(a)(7)(E), 92 Stat. at 1789 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
1804(a)(6)(E) (2006)).
77. Id. § 104(a)(7)(B), 92 Stat. at 1789 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
1804(a)(6)(B) (2006)).
78. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291, amending 50 U.S.C. §§
1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B).
79. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, § 105, 92 Stat. at 1790
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2006)).
80. The judges referred to are members of a special court, known as the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which is made up of a select group of
federal district court judges. Id. § 103(a), 92 Stat. at 1788 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2006)). FISA also provides for a second
court, comprised of three federal district or appellate judges, which reviews
the denial of FISA applications. Id. § 103(b), 92 Stat. at 1788 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2006)).
81. Id. § 105(a)(1)-(2), 92 Stat. at 1790 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(a)(1) (2006)).
82. Id. § 105(a)(3), 92 Stat. at 1790 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
1805(a)(2) (2006)).
83. Id. § 105(a)(4), 92 Stat. at 1790 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
1805(a)(3) (2006)).
84. Id. § 105(a)(5), 92 Stat. at 1790 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
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requirement differs from that usually required for Fourth
Amendment searches or seizures, including electronic
surveillance. The issuing judge must determine, based on the
application, that there is probable cause that ―the target of the
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power . . . [and that the telephone or location] is being
used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent.‖85
Other provisions of Section 105 concern more technical and
formal requirements, including specifications in the judicial
order such as periods of authorized use,86 retention and use
requirements,87 emergency authorizations,88 testing of
equipment,89 and liability issues.90 The limitation of this
probable cause requirement is important. In contrast to
probable cause requirements in criminal investigations, there
is no requirement that the judge find probable cause that the
electronic surveillance will actually provide any foreign
intelligence. Rather, the requirement is simply a probable
cause finding that the target is a foreign power or agent. The
connection between the nature of the target (the judicial
finding) to the information important to national security is
entirely contained in the certification requirements of Section
104. As noted above, a senior administration official must
certify ―that the certifying official deems the information
sought to be foreign intelligence information . . . and that a
significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign

1805(4) (2006)).
85. Id. § 105(a)(3)(A)-(B), 92 Stat. at 1790 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
1805(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2006)). The omitted language within the quote is a proviso
that prohibits concluding that a United States person is a foreign power or
agent ―solely upon the basis of‖ protected First Amendment activities. Id. §
105(a)(3)(A), 92 Stat. at 1790 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A)
(2006)).
86. Id. § 105(d), 92 Stat. at 1791 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §
1805(d) (2006)).
87. Id. § 105(g), 92 Stat. at 1793 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(g) (2006)).
88. Id. § 105(e), 92 Stat. at 1791-92 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §
1805(e) (2006)).
89. Id. § 105(f)(1), 92 Stat. at 1792 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f)(1)
(2006)).
90. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, § 225, 115 Stat. 272, 295-96 (current version at 50
U.S.C. § 1805(h) (2006)).
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intelligence information.‖91 Thus, the required connection to
suspicious behavior is entirely based on the government‘s
purpose.
3. What Was Not Subject to FISA
The gaps in FISA are significant. As enacted, the law
governed only electronic surveillance of communications with a
clear connection to the United States. This was consistent with
executive branch policy throughout the last thirty years, policy
that holds that international use of most investigative
techniques, including electronic surveillance, is exempt from
constitutional regulation and should remain exempt from
Thus, FISA elaborated on the
congressional oversight.92
categories recognized in Keith. Some international intelligence
operations came under this regulatory scheme,93 while others
apparently remained subject only to executive supervision.
91. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(A)-(B) (2006).
See also 50 U.S.C. §
1823(a)(6)(B).
92. This fit into Keith‘s rationale, which held that domestic electronic
surveillance was not permitted by Congress in the 1968 law, but which was
subject to constitutional requirements akin, if not identical, to those
attending criminal law electronic surveillance. The Bush administration also
took the view that any attempt by Congress to regulate international use of
investigative techniques, at least in the context of the war on terrorism,
would be an unconstitutional infringement on the Commander-in-Chief
power. See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, to Majority
Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/olc/2006/nsawhite-paper.pdf. See also John Cary Sims, How the Bush Administration’s
Warrantless Surveillance Program Took the Constitution on an Illegal,
Unnecessary, and Unrepentant Joyride, 12 UCLA J. INT‘L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
163 (2007).
93. More recently, supporters of broad executive power have argued that
any congressional regulation of intelligence surveillance is unconstitutional.
See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/doj11906wp.pdf. This is fine
as a matter of governmental theory. There is not a lot of law to support this
view, however, other than United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936). That case includes language that on its face supports robust
executive powers in the international sphere. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at
320. The underlying premise of Curtiss-Wright, however, is that the
President is supreme with respect to carrying out international aspects of
U.S. law, such as conducting relations with foreign nations—not with respect
to making United States international law. The decision itself upheld
congressional action authorizing executive action, much as FISA does. Id. at
312-22.
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Domestic intelligence investigation, such as that involved in
Keith, presumably remained subject to Title III and would be
permitted only upon meeting the demanding standards of that
statute.
Over the years, additional gaps in FISA have been
discovered, and some have been filled. For example, new
technologies, such as email communications and cell-phones,
have necessitated statutory amendments to expand
investigative powers.94 This was a major issue in the early
years of the War on Terrorism, when the Bush Administration
credibly argued that FISA was outdated.95
The most notable gap, however, would seem to be that
FISA does not cover criminal investigations, even those that
might involve foreign powers or international terrorists. This
was not an oversight. Title III still applies to criminal
investigations and, in fact, specifically provides for courtordered electronic surveillance under traditional standards for
many federal crimes generally committed by foreign agents or
terrorists.96 Most telling is the fact that Title III was amended
after FISA was enacted to include some of these crimes,
including crimes that, by definition, involve international
terrorism.97 The difference between FISA and Title III is that
94. See, e.g., United and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USAPATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, § 206, 115 Stat. 272, 282
(codified as amending 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2006)) (granting roving
surveillance authority to FISA intercept orders to allow agents to follow a
target‘s communications without additional court action where the target
changes communication services). See also Orin S. Kerr, Updating the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (2008)
(discussing the need to modernize FISA); Robert A. Pikowsky, An Overview of
the Law of Electronic Surveillance Post September 11, 2001, 94 L. LIBR. J. 601
(2002).
95. See, e.g., Concerning the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act:
Hearing on S. 2248 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, National
Security
Division,
Department
of
Justice),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/docs/final-wainstein-sjc-testimony103007.pdf; Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed., A FISA Fix, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2007, at 31; Eric Lichtblau, Deal is Struck to Overhaul Wiretap Law, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2008, at A1.
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2006) (providing for use of Title III
electronic surveillance for crimes including espionage, sabotage, violence at
international airports, and terrorist attacks).
97. See id. § 2516(q) (providing that Title III orders are permitted for
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FISA applies to investigations that seek foreign intelligence,
while Title III applies to those that are essentially attempts to
collect evidence for criminal prosecution. This is the only
reading consistent with the case law of the period, Keith and
Truong.
B. FISA Over the Years
1. The Judicial Response
Although Truong is heavily cited, as discussed above, it
addressed pre-FISA electronic surveillance, and is therefore
most applicable to claims of inherent presidential power.
Several other circuit court decisions did, however, address the
meaning and application of FISA after its enactment. One
such case is United States v. Duggan, which reviewed a
conviction based in part on FISA electronic surveillance of
Provisional Irish Republican Army members who came to the
United States to obtain weapons and other items for use in
paramilitary actions in Northern Ireland.98
That court
considered several constitutional challenges to FISA.99 It noted
that prior to FISA, courts were generally supportive of a
presidential power to conduct warrantless electronic
surveillance in the foreign intelligence sphere.100 It also
accurately described Keith as limited to domestic surveillance
and signaling approval of a flexible application of the Fourth
Amendment in the intelligence sphere.101 The court then
reasoned that FISA was Congress‘ attempt to take up the
Supreme Court‘s suggestion in Keith concerning flexible
application and to resolve Fourth Amendment questions in the
intelligence sphere through the complex machinery of the
crimes related to the use of chemical weapons and various additional crimes
relating to terrorism).
98. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 65-67 (2d Cir. 1984).
99. See, e.g., id. at 71-75 (presenting arguments that the law was so
broad and vague as to deny due process, that it violated the Fourth
Amendment by not requiring probable cause of criminal conduct, and that it
violated Equal Protection by providing less protection to lawful non-resident
aliens than to citizens and resident aliens; the court refused to bite at any of
these arguments).
100. Id. at 72.
101. Id. at 72-73.
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statute.102 Using constitutional interest-balancing, the court
concluded that FISA‘s procedures reflected a reasonable
balance of rights and intelligence needs.103 Thus, the court
upheld the law and acknowledged that there was no probable
cause requirement if the surveillance ―will in fact lead to the
gathering of foreign intelligence information.‖104 The court also
upheld the in camera review of the affidavits and certifications
to determine compliance with FISA and the Fourth
Amendment.105
The Duggan court briefly referred to the ―other purposes‖
issue, concluding that courts should generally accept the
government‘s certifications on the issue of purpose.106 The
court understood that there is a logical connection between
intelligence information and evidence of criminal behavior, and
seemed to see this as a reason to allow both the surveillance for
intelligible purposes, along with the use of its resulting
evidence in criminal prosecutions.107 The court did recognize
that there would be room for challenges, however, concluding
that general Fourth Amendment doctrine concerning false
assertions in search warrant paperwork would be applicable.108
Accordingly, it indicated that a false assertion that the
electronic surveillance was for foreign intelligence would be a
violation of FISA.109 It would necessarily also be a violation of
the Fourth Amendment, as the combined effect of Keith and
FISA meant that domestic electronic surveillance would be
102. Id. at 73.
103. Id. at 72-73. Of particular note, the court recognized that the
probable cause findings relate to the target‘s status and use of the telephone
or other instrument of electronic surveillance. Id.
104. Id. at 73.
105. Id. at 78.
106. Id. at 77.
107. ―Finally, we emphasize that otherwise valid FISA surveillance is
not tainted simply because the government can anticipate that the fruits of
such surveillance may later be used, as recognized in 1806(b), as evidence in
a criminal trial.‖ Id. at 78.
108. Id. at 77. The court referred to Franks v. Delaware and by analogy
required a person challenging a FISA purpose certification ―to make ‗a
substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included‘ in the
application and that the allegedly false statement was ‗necessary‘ to the FISA
Judge‘s approval of the application.‖ Id. (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)).
109. Id.
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outside the parameters of both FISA and Title III, and
therefore unconstitutional.110
2. The Wall
Based in part on Truong and other cases even more
explicit about the purpose limitation of FISA, the government
began to carefully limit access by criminal investigators and
prosecutors to intelligence obtained in FISA electronic
surveillance, and vice versa. The rationale of this ―wall,‖ as it
became known, was to protect both types of government
investigations. Information obtained under FISA would not be
shared with criminal investigators in many instances in order
to protect criminal cases from being ―tainted,‖ should it later be
determined that its use was inappropriate. The purpose of the
wall in the other direction is less obvious.111
David Kris, who served in a senior capacity at the Justice
Department in the early years of the Bush Administration–the
period in which the wall was largely dismantled—argues that
the wall was never required by law.112 He traces the path by
which all three branches of government, including both
Republican and Democratic presidential administrations,
110. Other courts of the pre-2001 period tended to follow Truong and
accept the ―primary purpose‖ theory. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 952
F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464
(11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 247, 251 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (decided by future Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey). But cf.
United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988) (addressing but not
deciding the issue).
111. FISA would not apply to those investigations, but arguments could
be built on the limitations on use of Title III electronic surveillance and grand
jury evidence to prevent consideration in intelligence, as opposed to law
enforcement, matters.
112. Kris served as Associate Deputy Attorney General during the Bush
Administration, and now serves as Assistant Attorney General for National
Security. See U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, National Security Division: Mission and
Function, www.justice.gov/nsd/bio.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). He has
written a detailed study of the wall. See David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of
the FISA Wall, 17 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 487 (2006). Kris is no supporter of
the wall, but his description of its history is more measured than that of most
articles by people on either side of such hot-button topics. Kris was a
litigator in the case that supposedly ended the wall, see In re Sealed Case,
310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), and he describes himself as one of its
principal authors, Kris, supra, at 487 n.* (unnumbered footnote), but his view
on the underlying flaw in the wall was not adopted by that court.
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created largely separate intelligence and law enforcement
tracks.113 The most notable point in this history was in 1995,
when the Department of Justice‘s Office of Legal Counsel
issued a memorandum concluding that the wall was central to
convincing courts that a foreign intelligence electronic
This
surveillance satisfied the primary purpose test.114
memorandum was soon followed by a March memorandum
from Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick,115 as well as
by a July memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno116
on policies and procedures for coordinating law enforcement
and foreign intelligence investigations. In general, these
documents accepted the primary purpose requirement, and
therefore directed that foreign intelligence electronic
surveillance be limited to matters in which obtaining such
intelligence was the primary purpose.117 The documents then
went beyond the apparent legal requirements by limiting
disclosure and minimizing reliance on joint investigative
teams.118 Kris argues that, while the Department of Justice
policies encouraged coordination in some respects, their
practical effects were to limit coordination.119 Early in the
Bush Administration, several policy changes served to enhance
coordination, but most aspects of the wall still remained in
place in September 2001.120
The existence of the wall and the impact of limiting
information concerning terrorist activities became a major
controversy after the September 11 attacks. The Department
of Justice issued new guidelines permitting much more contact
113. Kris, supra note 112, at 499-506.
114. Id. at 499 & n.69 (citing Memorandum from Walter Dellinger,
Assistant Attorney General for the Office of the Legal Counsel, to Michael
Vatis, Deputy Director, Executive Office for National Security (Feb. 14, 1995)
(on file with Kris)).
115. See id. at 501 & n.79 (citing Memorandum from Jaime S. Gorelick,
Deputy Attorney General, to Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney, Southern District
of
New
York
et
al.
(March
1995),
http://www.justice.gov/ag/testimony/2004/1995_gorelick_memo.pdf).
116. See id. at 504 & n.99 (citing Memorandum from Janet Reno,
Attorney General, to Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division et
al. (July 19, 1995), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html).
117. Id. at 501-06.
118. Id. at 503.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 507-08.
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between investigative and intelligence operatives.121 Attorney
General Ashcroft also chose to raise the issue during his
testimony before the September 11 Commission, as he accused
Gorelick, by then a member of the Commission, of
responsibility for intelligence lapses leading to the attacks as a
result of her role in establishing the wall.122
3. The 1995 Authorization of Surreptitious Searches
In 1995, Congress amended FISA to permit physical
searches within the United States under standards and
procedures similar to those applicable to electronic
surveillance.123 Thus, intelligence officers could conduct actual
entries into private buildings, including homes, without
meeting the probable cause standard generally applicable to
criminal searches. Such searches could occur over a period of
up to one year, even without judicial approval, if the premises
were not those of a covered ―U.S. person.‖124 The most
noteworthy aspect of such searches is not the absence of the
traditional probable cause requirement, or the fairly limited
judicial role.125 Instead, it is the fact that the searches are by
121. See id. at 507-11.
122. See ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH‘S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN
JUSTICE 269-73 (2009). The book by Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, Chairs
of the 9/11 Commission, addresses some of the Commission‘s conflicts with
Ashcroft on various issues. See THOMAS H. KEAN & LEE H. HAMILTON,
WITHOUT PRECEDENT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION (2006). The
Chairs found Ashcroft to be very hard to deal with, perhaps because of leaks
criticizing him that came from inside the Commission. Id. at 194. He stagemanaged his testimony very dramatically, as evidenced by his refusal to
provide written copies of his formal statement before reading it on national
television. Id. While all witnesses defended their own turf and criticized
others to some degree, Kean and Hamilton characterize Ashcroft as the most
defensive and antagonistic witness, and argue that he attacked Gorelick far
beyond what the record could support. Id. at 194-96. They argue that he
changed facts to manipulate public reaction, and note that even the
Republicans on the Commission would not accept his assertions. Id. at 196.
They also claim that President Bush disapproved of this behavior, indicated
that it would stop, and largely ignored Ashcroft after his confrontation with
the Commission. Id. at 208-10.
123. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No.
103-359, § 807, 108 Stat. 3423, 3443-3453 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §
1822-29 (2006)).
124. 50 U.S.C. § 1822(a)(1) (2006).
125. The statute provides for the contents of the application to the FISA
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their nature surreptitious. The multiple entries and year-long
authorization periods established by the statute necessarily
mean that entries will be secret and unreported to the owner or
occupant, conceivably forever. The statute provides for notice
only after the end of the national security interest.126
These so-called ―sneak and peek‖ searches are not limited
to intelligence matters. They have been permitted since the
1979 Supreme Court decision of Dalia v. United States, which
authorized surreptitious physical entries in connection with
Still,
installation of electronic surveillance equipment.127
outside of the foreign intelligence setting, such searches are
carefully limited in several respects. Traditional probable
cause is a requirement, as is notice, although it comes after a
delay.128
court, including, as amended in 2001, the ―significant purpose‖ requirement
and the findings required in the order authorizing the search. United and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit.
II, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291, amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B),
1823(a)(7)(B) (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B)).
126. 50 U.S.C. § 1825(b) (2006). This portion of FISA contains many
other detailed provisions on physical searches, including notifications when
U.S. persons are involved, suppression standards, and in camera review. Id.
§ 1825.
127. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979). The Court interpreted
Title III as authorizing surreptitious entry for the purpose of installing and
maintaining the court-ordered listening device, noting that ―[t]he plain effect
of the detailed restrictions of § 2518 is to guarantee that wiretapping or
bugging occurs only when there is a genuine need for it and only to the extent
that it is needed.‖ Id. at 250.
128. See Section 3101a of Title 18 of the United States Code, which was
enacted as part of the USA-PATRIOT Act:
Delay—With respect to the issuance of any warrant or
court order . . . to search for and seize any property or
material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense . . .
any notice required . . . may be delayed if . . . the court finds
reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate
notification of the execution of the warrant may have an
adverse result . . . [;] the warrant prohibits the seizure of
any tangible property, any wire or electronic communication
. . . , except where the court finds reasonable necessity for
the seizure; and . . . the warrant provides for the giving of
such notice within a reasonable period not to exceed 30 days
after the date of its execution, or on a later date certain if
the facts of the case justify a longer period of delay.
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C. The USA-PATRIOT Act Amendment
1. The Statutory Change
As noted above, the USA-PATRIOT Act included a
provision that was intended to break down the wall. According
to Assistant Attorney General Kris, after the September 11
attacks, the Department of Justice sent to Congress an
amendment to FISA that would allow foreign intelligence
electronic surveillance when ―a purpose‖ rather than ―the
purpose‖ of the electronic surveillance or surreptitious search
was to obtain foreign intelligence information.129 Congress
later changed the standard, opting for ―a significant purpose,‖
which was far more limited than the Department had wanted,
but significantly more generous than the previous statutory
requirement that ―the‖ purpose be to obtain foreign intelligence
information.130 This would seem likely to change the test that
has been followed in most courts, which requires that
intelligence be the primary purpose of the investigation.

18 U.S.C. § 3101a(b)(1)-(3) (2006). The ―adverse result‖ is defined in Section
2705 of Title 18 and includes: ―(1) endangering the life or physical safety of
an individual; (2) flight from prosecution; (3) destruction of or tampering with
evidence; (4) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (5) otherwise seriously
jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.‖ § 2705(a)(2). These
reasons are intrinsically different from those applicable to surreptitious FISA
searches, which are, as they should be, focused on gaining information about
foreign intelligence.
129. Kris, supra note 112, at 508 (emphasis added) (discussing the USAPATRIOT Act‘s amendments to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (now
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B) (2006)). By this time, of
course, the change would also allow greater use of physical searches. See
discussion supra Part I(B)(3).
130. On changes to FISA and other statutes governing investigative
powers during this period, see ANNA C. HENNING & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT (FISA) SET TO EXPIRE IN 2009 (2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509762&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf;
GINA
MARIE STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRIVACY: AN
ABBREVIATED OUTLINE OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND
ELECTRONIC
EAVESDROPPING
(2009),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/98-326.pdf; Robert Bloom & William J. Dunn,
The Congressional Infirmity of Warrantless NSA Surveillance: The Abuse of
Presidential Power and the Injury to the Fourth Amendment, 15 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 147 (2006); Burton, supra note 60; Pikowsky, supra note 94.
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This subtle distinction was potentially important. Under
the previous test, the main purpose had to be intelligence
gathering—the government had to be seeking information to
help in its future responses to international developments or
terrorism. Collection of evidence for criminal prosecution was
welcome and could be anticipated if the targets revealed their
involvement in actions punishable under U.S. criminal law, but
obtaining such evidence could not be the primary objective.
The wall, of course, was one way of indicating adherence to this
principle. Agents from the intelligence side dominated the
planning and execution of FISA surveillance, and information
was shared with criminal investigators only where it could be
established that such action was subsidiary to a dominant
intelligence purpose.131 Under the revised version, apparently
the only requirement was that the agents establish that
seeking foreign intelligence was a non-trivial part of the
enterprise.132 This would seem self-evident in most cases. As
such, the wall was anachronistic, at least as far as FISA was
concerned. The Department responded by dismantling the wall
internally to some degree, and then by seeking to have the
FISC modify requirements in FISA orders to reflect the greater
power of the government to share information obtained in
electronic surveillance.133
2. Judicial Responses to the 2001 Amendment
The battle over the 2001 amendment began in earnest in
131. The wall operated in slightly different ways during different
periods. See Kris, supra note 112, at 499-505 (―History of the FISA Wall‖
through USA-PATRIOT Act amendment to FISA).
132. Kris addresses several ramifications of the wall, addressing both
civil liberties and security concerns. Kris, supra note 112, at 518-21. The
wall is largely irrelevant to who is subject to surveillance and what
information is sought or intercepted. Id. at 519. FISA targets usually
commit crimes relevant to espionage or terror, but could also commit
unrelated crimes. Kris suggests non-international or non-terrorism crimes,
such as child pornography or theft, both of which often involve computers and
communication systems. Id. at 519-20. A prosecutor might want to
scrutinize a target‘s email accounts for both types of offenses. There can be
legitimate national security reasons to pursue unrelated offenses by national
security targets, if only because additional criminal liability might result in a
cooperative witness rather than a silent defendant. Id. at 520-23.
133. This is described, from an insider‘s perspective, in Kris, supra note
112, at 510-11.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20

28

648

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

2002 when the FISC issued a general order restricting the
Department of Justice‘s use of FISA to investigations not
primarily intended for criminal prosecution.134 The conflict
arose in the context of motions by the Department of Justice to
vacate minimization and wall procedures in matters then
before the FISC. The FISC approved some of the government‘s
requested changes but denied others. Rather than permit the
fairly unregulated joint operation of intelligence and law
enforcement investigations requested by the Department of
Justice, the court ruled that the following language should be
included in FISA orders:
The FBI, the Criminal Division, and [the
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review] may
consult with each other to coordinate their efforts
to investigate or protect against foreign attack or
other grave hostile acts, sabotage, international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities by
foreign powers or their agents.
Such
consultations and coordination may address,
among other things, exchanging information
already acquired . . . and overall strategy of both
investigations in order to ensure that the
overlapping intelligence and criminal interests of
the United States are both achieved. . . . [[T]he
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review] shall be
invited to all such consultations, and if they are
unable to attend, [they] shall be apprised of the
substance of the consultations forthwith in
writing so that the Court may be notified at the
earliest opportunity.
Notwithstanding
the
foregoing,
law
enforcement
officials
shall
not
make
recommendations
to
intelligence
officials
concerning the initiation, operation, continuation
or expansion of FISA searches or surveillances.
Additionally, the FBI and the Criminal Division
134. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (FISA Ct. 2002).
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shall ensure that law enforcement officials do not
direct or control the use of FISA procedures to
enhance criminal prosecution . . . .135
The key language, of course, was the ban on law
enforcement officials taking a supervisory role, which might
suggest that criminal enforcement rather than intelligence
collection purposes were dominant.
In effect, the court
partially reversed the Department‘s decision to lower the wall,
but acted through the minimization requirements of FISA,
rather than through the ―intelligence purpose‖ requirement.136
These provisions were included in two electronic
surveillance orders issued later that year, and the Department
of Justice appealed to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review (―FISCR‖).137 That court overturned the
FISC‘s restrictions in a decision that took the lower court to
task. First, the FISCR reached out to decide that the use of the
wall was inappropriate, even under the original text of FISA
that was enacted in 1978.138 This was unnecessary because the
court‘s interpretation of the amended version of the statute
would have itself resolved all issues pertinent to the dispute,
and the Department of Justice had not even made this broader
argument in the court below.
Nevertheless, the FISCR
addressed the history of surveillance authorizations under
FISA and concluded that nothing in the original statute
mandated the high wall imposed by the Department and, now,
by the FISC.139 The FISCR concluded that Truong was
inapplicable to FISA cases and had been blindly followed,
rather than intelligently applied, in the federal appellate cases
that followed it by adopting the ―primary purpose‖ test.140
The FISCR then addressed the status of joint
―intelligence/criminal‖
investigations
under
the
2001
amendments to FISA. It concluded that the statutory revision

135. Id. at 625.
136. See id. at 616-20 (characterizing action as part of minimization
requirements).
137. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
138. Id. at 722-28.
139. Id. at 723-25.
140. Id. at 725-28.
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resolved any doubt on this issue.141
This allowed the
government to use FISA procedures in cases in which criminal
prosecution was in fact the primary motivation of the
investigation.
The FISCR stated that ―the Patriot Act
amendment, by using the word ―significant,‖ eliminated any
justification for the FISA court to balance the relative weight
the government places on criminal prosecution as compared to
other counterintelligence responses.‖142 The opinion concluded
by reexamining these issues through the prism of the Fourth
Amendment. Here the FISCR found the FISA process lawful
as long as the government was in fact acting through its
That is, as long as the
foreign intelligence powers.143
government was seeking information on foreign intelligence as
defined in FISA, it could use the more lenient procedures
permitted by FISA rather than the traditional requirements
imposed in criminal investigations.144
The two courts therefore confronted similar, yet different,
issues.
The FISC looked to minimization, a statutory
requirement that had not been changed from the original FISA
provisions, and which required that electronic surveillance be
conducted so as to minimize the intrusion on U.S. persons,
largely by limiting disclosure and use of intercepted
conversations (and evidence discovered in surreptitious
searches).145 Accordingly, the FISC limited the disclosure and
141. Id. at 728-38.
142. Id. at 735.
143. Id. at 736-37.
144. Id. at 745. Kris‘s argument, which was part of the government‘s
argument to the FISCR, was that there was no dichotomy between law
enforcement and foreign intelligence searches because the President has the
constitutional authority to act to protect national security through law
enforcement, and therefore, the less demanding FISA procedures apply to
criminal investigations conducted in order to protect national security. Kris,
supra note 112, at 519-23. The short answer to this point is that, just as the
President and Congress have powers with respect to criminal prosecutions for
offenses such as counterfeiting or piracy, their choice to use the criminal
processes means that the constitutional (and other) laws relating to the
criminal process are presumably applicable. In other words, a presidential
decision to use the criminal law to achieve national objectives beyond law
enforcement does not eliminate the Fourth Amendment‘s requirement of
reasonable searches and seizures any more than it permits evading the First
Amendment‘s rights of free speech or the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment.
145. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615 (FISA Ct. 2002).
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use of those conversations for non-foreign intelligence
purposes.146 On appeal, the FISCR, however, largely accepted
the Department of Justice‘s argument that the modification of
FISA by the USA-PATRIOT Act eliminated any need to
separate intelligence investigations from dual purpose
intelligence/criminal investigations.147
The few cases that have addressed this issue indicate a
trend to accept the FISCR analysis of In re Sealed Case. The
Seventh Circuit adopted this reasoning in United States v.
Ning Wen.148 Three 2008 federal district court decisions also
upheld the view that the USA-PATRIOT Act amendment was
constitutional and that the law now permits the use of FISA to
collect evidence for criminal prosecutions.149 As of August
2009, the only noteworthy decision to the contrary is a district
court decision involving Brandon Mayfield, the Oregon
attorney mentioned in this article‘s Introduction, who was
wrongly accused of involvement in the 2004 Madrid train
bombing.150 That decision held that the 2001 amendment was
unconstitutional on Fourth Amendment grounds, essentially
finding that the authorization to engage in intrusive searches
of criminal suspects without probable cause of criminal activity
rendered the law unconstitutional even where there is a factual
connection to an intelligence purpose.151
There is little reason to doubt that the FISCR‘s view will
prevail, at least in the short run. The primary purpose test
had a long pedigree, but the USA-PATRIOT Act constituted a

146. Id. at 617.
147. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 722, 732. It is fair to conclude that
neither court had it quite right. While minimization is required by statute as
well as, arguably, the Fourth Amendment—for at least some FISA
surveillance—the FISC‘s broad generic ruling did not respond to the real
issue. The FISCR, on the other hand, had the right issue—law enforcement
purposes for FISA surveillance—but overlooked the constitutional line drawn
by the Supreme Court between law enforcement and special needs searches.
See generally discussion infra Part III.
148. United States v. Ning Wen, 477 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2007).
149. One, of course, is United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299
(D. Conn. 2008). See also United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D.
Minn. 2008); United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass.
2007).
150. Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007),
vacated, 588 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2009).
151. Id. at 1042.
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congressional willingness to loosen the requirement. On top of
that, until 2002, federal courts had no FISCR precedent to
draw upon, and Truong and other cases dealing with the
original FISA therefore became the basic decisions in the field.
With the FISCR ruling, however, the precedent now comes
from a court with specific delegated authority to decide FISA
issues,152 and it is unlikely that the Oregon precedent in
Mayfield will convince many other lower courts. Perhaps more
significantly, the FISCR decision is from a court with
nationwide jurisdiction and which provides the primary
appellate judicial supervision of the FISA process. As such,
decisions to the contrary, such as Mayfield, may seem to be
trivial outliers to other courts. FISA judges are themselves
bound to follow the precedent of In re Sealed Case, and
government agents involved in FISA investigations will have
every reason to follow the ―law‖ of the FISCR.153 For example,
one court that took other constitutional and statutory
challenges to government actions in an intelligence
investigation very seriously treated this challenge to the use of
FISA evidence as insignificant.154 As shown below, while this
is arguably consistent with traditional Fourth Amendment law,
152. There is somewhat of a practical anomaly here, however, as the
seven FISA judges who agreed to the ruling in In re All Matters had probably
much more experience under the law than the three judges on the FISCR
who reversed that ruling. In re Sealed Case was the first appeal considered
by the FISCR. 310 F.3d at 719. The seven judges of the FISC all concurred
in All Matters. 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 625 (FISA Ct. 2002). During the seven
years preceding the 2002 litigation, FISC judges had considered—and
approved—over 5000 applications for FISA orders. See Electronic Privacy
Information Center, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders 1979-2007,
http;//epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2010).
153. There is also reason to believe that the government could more
readily evade facing courts that may lean toward Mayfield through venue
selection. In contrast to criminal investigations under Title III, in which the
circuit law that narrows government authority in a particular area must be
followed within the districts that make up the circuit, here the FISCR would
seem to set the law under which surveillance is conducted. At most, adverse
circuit law would preclude criminal prosecutions based on evidence obtained
during the electronic surveillance within those jurisdictions.
154. In Turkmen v. Ashcroft, the court simply drew an analogy to
routine criminal searches and concluded that there is no credible objection to
using in a criminal setting evidence obtained through national security
electronic surveillance. Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02CV2307(JG), 2006 WL
1662663, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006), aff’d, rev’d on other grounds per
curiam, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009).
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there are credible arguments to the contrary, and the courts
should not blindly follow In re Sealed Case any more than they
should have blindly followed Truong.
II. Foreign Intelligence Searches in the
Fourth Amendment Universe
A. Special Needs
This structure established by FISA, to allow electronic
surveillance where foreign intelligence is a significant purpose
of the action, is arguably consistent with the prevailing law
concerning Fourth Amendment searches and seizures. In a
series of decisions over the last thirty years, the Supreme
Court has approved searches and seizures, and later use of
resulting evidence in court, where the government had acted
for a legitimate, non-law-enforcement reason, even where the
government did not meet traditional Fourth Amendment
requirements.155 This is the ―special needs‖ exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements. If the action is
―reasonable‖ under the Fourth Amendment, then the intrusion
is lawful.156 Because the action is lawful under the Fourth
Amendment, there is no reason to exclude the resulting
evidence in criminal trials.
There are at least two legs to this principle in operation.
One is that courts are reluctant to second guess law
enforcement motives. If a government agent has a lawful basis
to search, the courts will not invalidate the search or bar use of
the seized evidence just because the officer took advantage of
that basis to search, even though the officer hoped or
anticipated finding evidence for a criminal prosecution.
Another, sometimes related, principle is the Plain View
Doctrine, in which the courts allow the seizure of evidence
discovered under one rationale when there is some second
reason that allows its seizure.157 These notions arguably come

155. See generally infra notes 159-82 and accompanying text.
156. See Anthony C. Coveny, When the Immovable Object Meets the
Unstoppable Force: Search and Seizure in the Age of Terrorism, 31 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 329 (2007).
157. See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
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together in the Pretense Search Doctrine, in which the courts
conclude that police officers may take advantage of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to stop a car for a vehicular
violation while intending to look for evidence of more serious
crimes.158 While these doctrines were hotly disputed when first
recognized, and while they do present significant questions
about the nature of Fourth Amendment protections, they are
unlikely to be reconsidered unless there is a sea change on the
Supreme Court. Analyses of Fourth Amendment aspects of
national security law must accordingly take them into account.
To this end, the following section builds on ―special needs‖ law
and these principles to provide an argument for dual purpose
foreign intelligence/law enforcement electronic surveillance
under FISA.
The ―special needs‖ doctrine was largely undeveloped when
Keith was decided. The general principle developed in a series
of cases in the late twentieth century, and is most closely
associated with New Jersey v. T.L.O.159 Over time the courts
have established four controlling factors: 1) the ―gravity of the
public concerns‖ leading to the search or seizure, 2) the extent
to which the search or seizure in fact advances those concerns,
3) the severity of the intrusion, and 4) the existence of a nonlaw enforcement purpose.160 There are several different ways
of organizing the resulting case law, but the most applicable to
foreign intelligence searches separates those settings that
involve what appear to be traditional searches and which are
reasonably likely to result in evidence that can be used in
criminal cases, from other cases that are more obviously civil in
nature. The first quasi-criminal category can be distinguished
from those that involve intrusions different in kind from law
enforcement searches, such as drug tests,161 or those that only
158. See infra notes 194-199 and accompanying text.
159. The case involved a search of a high school student‘s purse by a
school assistant principal who had reason to believe she had been smoking in
the women‘s restroom in violation of school rules. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 328 (1985).
160. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004). In that case, police
officers conducted a blockade near the scene of a fatal highway accident and
handed out fliers in an attempt to locate witnesses to the incident. As a
result of the blockade, Lidster was discovered to be driving under the
influence of alcohol. Id. at 422.
161. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives‘ Ass‘n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989) (drug testing of employees in transportation industries); Nat‘l
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indirectly involve government agents examining private items
or information.162 By examining the four factors in the context
of a quasi-traditional search such as electronic surveillance, the
four factors largely devolve into a fairly raw balancing of two
factors. In order to argue for the exception, the purpose must
not be law enforcement, so factor (4) is a ―yes/no‖ question that
must be resolved prior to applying the rest of the test. The first
two parts of the test, factors (1) and (2), seem complementary
and together add up to an overall evaluation of the value of
such searches to the government.163 The severity of the
intrusion, factor (3), is thus weighed against the value (both
the abstract importance of the purpose and the degree aspects
of parts (1) and (2)), in a manner typical of constitutional
balancing tests.
Border searches provide a good example of ―special needs‖
searches and reveal that they are not limited to new problems
or new legal rules.164 A more recent example is air security
searches. The limitations on privacy in air travel began several
decades ago with the rise of national security concerns,
primarily the use of commercial aviation by hijackers to defect,
or to otherwise engage in international terrorism.165 Such
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of
government employees involved in law enforcement).
162. This would seem to be the case with T.L.O. itself. The Fourth
Amendment was involved in a school‘s policy because the school was public,
but the underlying policy of keeping contraband off school property was not
inherently a law enforcement or even governmental policy, as private schools
would be expected to impose the same or similar rules.
163. This is reminiscent of the means/ends approach used in Due
Process and Equal Protection—here, the overall purpose must be important
and the intrusion must advance it to some unspecified degree. See JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ¶ 11.7 (8th ed. 2010)
(identifying due process/fundamental rights standards of review); id. ¶ 14.3
(identifying equal protection standards of review).
164. The courts have confirmed that searches at the nation‘s borders are
reasonable without warrants or probable cause due to the great national
interest in protecting the nation from harmful persons or things entering or
exiting the nation. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 15253 (2004). While this power is an aspect of sovereignty and international law
rather than law enforcement, the Fourth Amendment applies, but has very
limited concern. Searches may include examination of the contents of
vehicles, containers, personal property, and the like. See, e.g., Chehade Refal
v. Lazaro, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1112-15 (D. Nev. 2009) (collecting cases).
165. See generally James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Validity of Airport
Security Measures, 125 A.L.R. 5th 281, § 2a (2005). See also United States v.
Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972) (early reliance on hijacker profile); United
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concerns led to security measures at odds with traditional
Fourth Amendment protections. The primary use of evidence
resulting from security searches, however, seems to be in
enforcement of routine criminal laws. Such searches are not
undertaken for criminal law enforcement purposes, but are at
least similar in operation to law enforcement searches. Agents
conducting air security searches look into private containers or
on individuals themselves for weapons or other dangerous
items. Contraband drugs and dangerous weapons, typical of
the items discovered during such searches, are routinely used
as evidence in criminal cases. Stated differently, a search of a
suitcase at an airport security checkpoint does not differ much
from a search of a suitcase during a criminal investigation
except that the purpose is security rather than law
enforcement.166
Air security searches are now commonplace, as anyone
who has traveled by air in recent years can attest. They are
also legally unimpeachable. Typical of cases upholding air
security searches is United States v. Edwards, decided in 1974,
a time at which such searches were far more limited than in
the post-2001 period.167 Edwards was an air passenger who
had activated a magnetometer and became subject to a search
of her carry-on baggage.168 In a bag, wrapped in highly
personal items, the inspector found glassine envelopes that
contained heroin.169 The majority engaged in a fairly simple
interest-balancing analysis, and decided that the potential
harm of air piracy was sufficiently grave to justify personal
searches at airport gates to prevent passengers from taking
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972) (reliance on magnetometer
to identify potential hijackers).
166. There are also serious privacy concerns about data mining of air
passengers. See, e.g., Stephen W. Dummer, Comment, Secure Flight and
Data Veillance, A New Type of Civil Liberties Erosion: Stripping Your Rights
When You Don’t Even Know It, 75 MISS. L.J. 583 (2006).
167. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974). See also
United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006) (modern decision
upholding airport security searches); United States v. Aukai, 440 F.3d 1168
(9th Cir. 2006) (same); Buchwalter, supra note 165, §§ II(A)(4)-(7), (9)-(10)
(collecting cases).
168. Today, of course, all air passengers are subject to searches of carryons and checked baggage, and at many airports, full body scans, somewhat
akin to virtual strip searches, are used for many passengers.
169. Edwards, 498 F.2d at 499.
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dangerous items on-board.170 The judges used the balancing
methodology then predominant to conclude that such
intrusions are reasonable.171 Judge Friendly‘s majority opinion
did note a reservation that foreshadowed the ―non-criminal
purposes‖ requirement, that if ―the Government is abusing its
authority‖ by using air security searches as a general means of
enforcing the criminal law, the search would be invalid and the
evidence inadmissible.172
This exception is no longer limited to air security. The
Second Circuit considered a New York City policy of conducting
random, suspicionless container searches of persons entering
the subway system.173 The Court held that because the
program was not a ―general means of enforcing the criminal
law,‖ the validity of the search under the Fourth Amendment
was measured under the far more lenient general balancing of
costs and benefits.174 Here, the public interest in preventing
attacks on the subways is obvious and compelling. Given the
then-even more recent international history of subway attacks,
it is remarkable that there was any debate on the issue at
all.175 Cases with little connection to international terrorism
reveal the extent to which the expanded notion of
governmental security search powers has pervaded the law.
This concern arose in United States v. Va Lerie, in which
cocaine was discovered in a search of a garment bag removed
from a bus luggage compartment by a state police officer.176
170. Id. at 500-01.
171. Id. A concurring opinion emphasized that Edwards and passengers
generally consent to a search, by virtue of the postings at the airports. Id. at
504 (Oakes, J., concurring). Other courts have also emphasized this consent
notion. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir.
1980). See also Buchwalter, supra note 165, § 2(A)(12).
172. Id. at 500.
173. Macwade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006). Coveny discusses
Macwade at length, concluding that it may foreshadow a world of little
privacy from such government intrusions, largely because the theoretical
sufficiency of the ―special needs‖ concept appears to overlook important
questions about the utility of such searches and the impact of such searches
on privacy. Coveny, supra note 156, at 331-34, 364-80.
174. Macwade, 460 F.3d at 267-69.
175. A similar analysis was applied by the same court to searches of
passengers on Lake Champlain ferries. Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67 (2d
Cir. 2006).
176. United States v. Va Lerie, 385 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 2004), rev’d en
banc, 424 F.3d 694, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 903.
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The constitutionality of the search seemed to turn on whether
the bag had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The court held that it had, consistent with circuit
precedent and normal understandings of the meaning of
―seizure‖ under the Fourth Amendment.177 A dissenting judge
argued, however, that such minor relocations should not
constitute seizures, specifically noting two factors.178 First, he
reminded the court that the conclusion would necessarily be
different at an air terminal, as passenger luggage is controlled
and subject to security examination without any concern about
whether it has been ―seized.‖179 Second, he suggested that
modern terrorism has changed the public‘s attitude that any
baggage, even first-class checked luggage, is subject to a
reasonable expectation of privacy.180 The judge alluded to the
privacy accorded persons and their belongings in air
transportation, which has eroded over the decades and is now
almost non-existent, presumably forever.181 The Madrid train
attacks, subway attacks in England, and bus attacks in Israel
all suggest that any distinction among forms of transportation
is unjustified by both logic and experience.182 The purpose of
protecting these common targets from terrorists necessarily
translates into broader search powers.
The FISCR now takes the position that FISA searches are
constitutional under a special needs analysis. In a 2008
decision considering the validity of provisions in the Protect
America Act of 2007, which required communications service
providers to assist the government in conducting foreign
intelligence electronic surveillance,183 the court decided that
the special needs principle applies by analogy.184 While the

177. Id. at 1146-49.
178. Id. at 1151-56 (Riley, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1156 (Riley, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1151-56 (Riley, J., dissenting). Both the district court and the
dissenting judge on appeal referred to the impact of the September 11 attacks
on privacy and government search powers. See id. at 1157 n.10 (Riley, J.,
dissenting).
181. See id. at 1157 n.10 (Riley, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1157 n.10 (Riley, J., dissenting).
183. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (to
be codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
184. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
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court reaffirmed the holding of In re Sealed Case, it concluded
that the central concern was ―the programmatic purpose of the
surveillances and whether–as in the special needs cases–that
programmatic purpose involves some legitimate objective
beyond ordinary crime control.‖185 As noted below, the court
also recognized the need to consider the totality of the
circumstances in order to apply the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.186
B. Traditional Dual Purpose Searches
Fourth Amendment law already acknowledges that
government officers will sometimes change or add purposes in
the course of their investigations. Much of the case law on
special needs searches is based upon this principle in action.
While some cases consider the constitutionality of a particular
government program in the context of a Fourth Amendment
challenge to the program regardless of an attempt by criminal
prosecutors to use evidence obtained in the search,187 most
courts address the issue in the context of a motion to suppress
evidence obtained during a non-law enforcement special needs
search. This was the issue in T.L.O., itself, and at least two of
the important Supreme Court decisions concerning
roadblocks.188
This notion is also the underlying premise of the Plain
View Doctrine, under which government officers are permitted
to seize evidence that they discover while otherwise acting
lawfully.189 A typical plain view seizure occurs when agents
executing a search warrant for one offense discover evidence of
a second offense. The central requirement is that the officer is
lawfully present where he or she locates the evidence that is
185. Id. at 1011.
186. Id. at 1012. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives‘ Ass‘n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989) (drug tests of transportation employees) and Michigan Dep‘t. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (D.U.I. roadblock).
188. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search of personal
property to enforce school rules); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004)
(roadblock search for accident investigation); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border checkpoint search).
189. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(a) (4th ed.
2004).
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seized.190 Thus, plain view seizures can occur when officers are
performing non-law enforcement functions, such as
community-care policing.191 There is no requirement that the
discovery be inadvertent or in any way accidental. Thus, it is
entirely permissible for agents to hope and expect to find
specific evidence, and then to seize it under the Plain View
Viewing this doctrine through the national
Doctrine.192
security purpose that underlies FISA, agents may permissibly
―seize‖ and use evidence of crimes discovered while acting in
their foreign intelligence capacity. Just as an officer who
notices illegal drugs during a D.U.I. roadblock or while
conducting a traffic stop may seize those drugs and use them as
evidence in a drug prosecution,193 so too may the intelligence
officer take note of and use evidence of federal crimes
committed by targets of FISA authorized electronic
surveillance.
The second leg supporting the use of security evidence in
criminal prosecutions is that the courts rarely question the
motivation of the officers in placing themselves at a location
where they can make a plain view seizure. This notion is
illustrated by what can be called the Pretense Stop, as
illustrated by the facts of Whren v. United States.194 In that
case, police officers observed a car committing a moving
violation and stopped the car to investigate, presumably in
order to issue a citation.195 As in so many such cases, drugs
were observed by the officer during the stop, and a drug seizure
and arrest followed.196 The defendants challenged both the
search and the seizure, arguing that the moving violation was
190. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (finding that the
officer was lawfully present because the search warrant was valid); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (finding that the officer was not
lawfully present because the search warrant that was executed was invalid).
191. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
192. This was the case in Horton, in which police officers had a search
warrant for the proceeds of a robbery, but failed to also seek a warrant for the
weapons used in the crime. The officers expected to seize the weapons, did
so, and the courts upheld the seizures under the Plain View doctrine. Horton,
496 U.S. at 133-42.
193. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
194. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
195. Id. at 808-09.
196. Id.
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so trivial that no reasonable officer would have stopped the car
unless motivated to look for evidence of other crimes while at
the driver‘s window, and that therefore, the plain view seizure
was a sham.197 The allegation was credible given the nature of
the traffic offense, its location, and the time of night, but the
Supreme Court concluded that even if the stop was a pretense,
that fact would be irrelevant to any challenge to the validity of
the stop.198 The officers had probable cause of a violation, and
therefore, their seizure of the vehicle during the traffic stop
was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.199
These theories all support the broad use of evidence
discovered in FISA-authorized investigations in criminal cases.
Stated simply, the argument is that as long as the action was
lawful under FISA, it can be redefined as a ―special needs‖
program of searches and seizures, and therefore evidence
discovered in ―plain view‖ during a FISA electronic surveillance
may be used in criminal prosecutions of any type—even if the
investigators were motivated by criminal, rather than
intelligence, reasons in conducting their electronic surveillance.
C. A Different Application of the Special Needs Doctrine
This is not the only way to read Supreme Court decisions
in this area. In some ways, the most applicable Supreme Court
decision is City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, which involved a
challenge to an Indianapolis program of conducting motor
vehicle checkpoints in order to prevent illegal drugs from
coming into city neighborhoods.200 These facts are obviously
very different from those surrounding foreign intelligence
197. Id. at 809.
198. Id. at 812-13.
199. Id. at 819. The ramifications of Whren are potentially quite broad.
It seems to allow police officers to shadow suspected criminals and use the
full force of arrest and search powers in any matter, no matter how trivial.
This notion resonates in the setting of foreign intelligence surveillances, see
infra Part IV(B)(4), and is consistent with the Bush administration‘s ―spit on
the sidewalk‖ policy that targeted suspected terrorists, see ASHCROFT, supra
note 24, at 124. See also LICHTBLAU, supra note 122, at 58. The ―spit on the
sidewalk‖ reference is to Kennedy‘s commitment to prosecuting organized
crime figures for any and all offenses, including trivial or otherwise rarely
prosecuted violations. See generally VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE
49-107 (1971).
200. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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searches, but the underlying premise is quite similar. In 1998,
the City of Indianapolis decided to conduct checkpoints at
various points throughout the city in order ―to interdict illegal
drugs.‖201 Cars were selected through a random process, police
conducted brief conversations with the drivers and passengers,
and the public was advised that the checkpoints would occur
through highly visible public notices posted ahead of time.202 A
six-justice majority invalidated the Indianapolis program.203
Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion for the Court emphasized several
points.
First, she noted that all previously approved
checkpoints were based on reasons other than law
enforcement.204 These were true ―special needs‖ cases, with
objectives such as ensuring safety in transportation, workplace
safety at dangerous or highly regulated industries, and
protecting the nation‘s borders.205 Government searches with
the ―general purpose of investigating crime‖ were
distinguished, and since Indianapolis had the primary purpose
of seizing illegal narcotics before they entered the community,
the majority concluded it could not characterize the city‘s
program as containing a non-law enforcement purpose—
notwithstanding the obvious public health and safety
ramifications of illegal drug use.206 The Court acknowledged
that, at some level of generality, all of the ―special needs‖
settings could be characterized as involving a law enforcement
purpose, such as detecting the offense of driving under the
influence.207 In a key passage, the Court distinguished Whren,
which otherwise would have seemed to be the strongest basis
for allowing Indianapolis‘s program.208 The Court noted,
however, that Whren disapproved of looking to the purpose of
the search only when there was objective probable cause of a
201. Id. at 34.
202. Id. at 34-36. The procedures were generally consistent with those
upheld in the context of a D.U.I. roadblock in Michigan Dep’t of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
203. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 33.
204. Id. at 37-40.
205. See id. at 37.
206. Id. at 41 (stating that ―[w]e have never approved a checkpoint
program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing‖).
207. Id. at 42-43.
208. Id. at 45.
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crime present.209 Where it is not present, as in the special
needs context, courts must examine the programmatic
purposes in order to determine whether what had occurred was
a legitimate ―special needs‖ search, or a pretext for an
unjustified criminal search.210 The Court also emphasized that
a secondary, non-law-enforcement or special needs purpose
It
would not be sufficient to legitimize a roadblock.211
acknowledged the validity of security searches such as those
conducted at airports and public buildings, but did not suggest
that the existence of terrorism in general, or specific
connections with international matters, exempted the
government‘s action from these underlying principles.212
Edmond is frustrating for scholars and courts trying to
evaluate the ―purposes‖ connection between law enforcement
and foreign intelligence. In one sense the application of the
decision in this setting is problematic. Justice O‘Connor‘s
opinion is typical of her style as much as Keith was typical of
Justice Powell‘s.213 The majority opinion never hazarded
beyond checkpoints or suspicionless stops, and it gave little
indication of the broader canvas in which ―special needs‖
claims are appropriate. The opinion asserted that there is a
borderline between the law enforcement purpose of interdicting
illegal drugs and the public safety justification of identifying
dangerous drivers, but it did not really explain where it lies. It
seems likely that the Court would uphold a checkpoint in
which officers distribute anti-drug public service brochures or
otherwise communicate the dangers of illegal drug use,214 so

209. Id.
210. The Court emphasized that it was the purpose of the general
program, implemented by government decision-makers, rather than that of
individual officers conducting the checkpoint, that was pertinent. Id. at 4546.
211. Id. at 46-47. If so, the Court reasoned, any criminal enforcement
roadblock could be made lawful by inclusion of a legitimate special needs
aspect, such as a license or sobriety check. Id. The Court even left open
whether a roadblock with a valid purpose would be legitimate if it also had a
secondary purpose of law enforcement. Id. at 47 n.2.
212. Id. at 47-48. A strong dissent challenged this emphasis on purpose
to separate lawful from unlawful checkpoints. Id. at 48-56.
213. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
214. This would seem consistent with Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419,
428 (2004) (upholding a police roadblock conducted in order to locate
witnesses of a fatal automobile crash). See supra note 160.
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the line would appear to illustrate the difference between a
strategic approach—the permissible programmatic purpose of
decreasing drug use—and the tactical approach—the
impermissible case-specific purpose of identifying those
transporting illegal drugs.
It would not be surprising to see a five- or even six-justice
majority, intent on approving the USA-PATRIOT Act‘s
expansion of FISA authority, treat Edmond as of no relevance
to FISA electronic surveillance or searches. Still, the decision
raises serious questions about the attempts to shoehorn
criminal enforcement purposes into foreign intelligence
searches. First, there is the need to find the border between
law enforcement and other purposes, even if Edmond does not
define it clearly in that setting. It is hard to characterize the
collection of evidence for proof of past crimes as anything other
than a law enforcement purpose, which would seem to be
consistent with the strategic/tactical distinction identified
above. Similarly, if the government in the foreign intelligence
sphere is to be free of the traditional strictures of the Fourth
Amendment, as FISA provides, it must be because FISA
investigations are truly premised on a purpose other than
criminal law enforcement.215 That is, FISA is a federal
statutory program for a non-law enforcement search, and it is
governed by those principles that govern such searches. So
understood, the creation of the wall and the need to limit FISA
actions to those in which foreign intelligence purposes
dominate is unremarkable. If anything, the primary purpose
requirement of pre-USA-PATRIOT Act FISA pushes the
envelope to some degree, as Edmond left open the question of
the validity of a checkpoint in which a legitimate special needs
purpose was accompanied by a secondary law enforcement
purpose. After the USA-PATRIOT Act amendment, FISA now
reverses the relationship, purporting to legitimate FISA
searches in which the foreign intelligence purpose is
―significant,‖ but secondary to a law enforcement purpose.
I argue below that the courts should reject this expansion
of FISA. In fact, both the Plain View and Pretense settings
215. This would presumably be dictated by Keith because that Court
seemed to hold that, while there would be room for Congress to provide
different procedures for intelligence investigations, in the criminal realm
Title III and traditional Fourth Amendment procedures necessarily apply.
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involve legitimate criminal investigative searches, and the
Fourth Amendment questions concern only whether additional
use may be made of the evidence obtained. In the FISA
situation, especially after the USA-PATRIOT Act amendments,
the difference is significant. Here the critical fact that permits
electronic surveillance (or a physical search) under FISA is
that the government‘s motive is in fact to obtain intelligence of
foreign intrigue for intelligence purposes—learning what other
nations or terrorist groups are planning to do. Under Keith,
the constitutional validity of even national security searches
subject to the Fourth Amendment would necessarily depend on
the purpose actually being foreign intelligence. In a situation
in which law enforcement is the dominant motive of electronic
surveillance, the far more stringent requirements of Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Act should apply. In other words, what
makes FISA different in terms of Fourth Amendment
requirements should also make it different with respect to
using evidence obtained during FISA investigations.216
IV. The ―Reasonableness‖ of FISA Searches to
Collect Criminal Evidence
A. The Totality of the Circumstances
The dominant theme of the last thirty years of Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment (and much of
the Fifth Amendment law as well) is built on the concept of the
totality of circumstances. Probable cause is not based on the
existence of specific categories of information, as it was for
many years.217 It is based on the totality of circumstances
known to the officer or magistrate making the determination in
the particular case.218 Consent to search, probably the most
216. Other reasons for this different treatment of FISA-obtained
evidence relate to aspects of the Fourth Amendment that were not really in
play at the time of Keith and the initial version of FISA. These include
changes in territoriality—cutbacks on the reach of the Fourth Amendment
and the growth of federal criminal offenses relating to acts in foreign nations.
They also include the change in central missions for the Department of
Justice and FBI.
217. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
218. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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widely used warrant exception, is also based on a totality of
circumstances analysis.219 Perhaps most generally, a totality of
circumstances analysis determines both whether a person has
been stopped by the police, thereby bringing Fourth
Amendment rights into play, and whether there is a reasonable
suspicion of a potential crime to justify that stop, and thus be
in compliance with constitutional requirements.220 As noted
above, the FISCR has accepted the totality of circumstances
methodology for determining the validity of FISA electronic
surveillance.221
For the most part, the totality of circumstances approach
has been a vehicle for scouring the record to identify possible
reasons that support police action, reasons that, by themselves,
may not amount to much, but, when considered in context with
other reasons—i.e., the totality—add up to a legitimate basis
for a police search or other Fourth Amendment action. Thus,
the totality of circumstances framework can be characterized
as ―police or prosecution-friendly.‖ In the area of dual-purpose
foreign intelligence and criminal investigation actions under
FISA, however, the totality of circumstances analysis reaches a
different result. Here the various circumstances add up to
illustrate the unreasonableness of allowing the broad use of
FISA searches and seizures in criminal investigations that
overlap with foreign intelligence operations. There are at least
six bases for this argument. In keeping with the totality
theme, any of these bases individually would probably not be a
convincing reason to deviate from the Whren, Plain View, and
Special Needs Doctrines, which might support law enforcement
use of these intelligence techniques. But two or three, and
219. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (finding
that the justifiability of a Terry-type seizure or search, like a seizure or
search based on probable cause, is supposed to be evaluated on ―the totality of
the circumstances—the whole picture‖); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544 (1980) (plurality opinion) (finding that the stop amounted to a
Fourth Amendment seizure) (accepted by majority in INS v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210 (1984)). Other constitutional tests that depend on the totality of
circumstances range from the very common evaluation of the voluntariness of
confessions, see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), to the
unusual assessment of the use of force to capture a fleeing suspect, see
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
221. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
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certainly all six together, make for a different calculation. In
context—in totality—these factors support the notion that the
Fourth Amendment, and probably rights contained in other
constitutional provisions as well, depends on limiting those
doctrines to their very different circumstances.
B.

Factors Detracting from the Reasonableness of FISA
Searches for Law Enforcement Purposes
1.

The Obvious Purposes and Public Openness of Most
Special Needs Searches

One of the reasons that the special needs category of
searches works as a variant of traditional Fourth Amendment
procedures is that it is usually apparent both that the
government‘s objective is not law enforcement and that
criminal evidence is only an accidental, if not always
surprising, byproduct of the civil purpose. Thus, agents
conduct a roadblock for a public safety purpose, and during
that roadblock discover evidence of a crime. It is no stretch to
conclude that the roadblock was conducted lawfully, and
therefore that use of the evidence derived in a criminal case is
equally lawful under the Plain View Doctrine. There are cases
where the purposes are not obvious or where there are multiple
purposes—and these can cause problems. Still, it is not
difficult to conclude that drug testing of individuals in safety or
sensitive positions is conducted to ensure that the persons in
those positions are drug-free, and not to collect evidence for
criminal prosecution.222 Similarly, roadblocks may be expected
to result in identifying some intoxicated drivers who are then
subject to criminal prosecution, but the roadblocks are
conducted in order to minimize drunk driving through
deterrence of the practice rather than through prosecution of
criminals.
This seems equally obvious in the classic security search:
the airport security gate checkpoint that now includes

222. This is clearly the case with respect to the Supreme Court‘s leading
cases on drug tests. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives‘ Ass‘n, 489
U.S. 602 (1989); Nat‘l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989).
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mandatory identification checks, metal detectors, x-rays of
carry-on belongings, and even virtual strip searches. It is
statistically likely that some persons will foolishly carry
evidence of a crime through such checkpoints and will be
discovered through the searches.223 But that is far from the
purpose, or even a significant purpose, of searches at airport
security gates. Rather, air security searches are conducted in
order to serve public safety by preventing air piracy or worse.
They are open, notorious, and very public.224 Air travelers
necessarily know what will happen to them at security
checkpoints, and they know they can avoid discovery of
embarrassing items or criminal evidence simply by leaving
them at home. Prominent and highly visible signs explain the
nature and extent of air security searches and urge persons
unwilling to undergo such searches to leave the terminal and
travel by other means. In other words, the governmental object
of ensuring air safety is served by preventing dangerous
passengers from trying anything foolish. When this approach
works, there is no evidence to use at trial. In all likelihood, the
government will never learn the identity of the potential air
pirates.225
FISA searches for foreign intelligence activities are
necessarily different. Part of the reason is that the government
in fact wants to find the very things that will constitute

223. There are numerous cases involving drug seizures and quite a few
involving weapons. See, e.g., United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374 (6th Cir.
1974) (handgun and knife activated metal detector); United States v. Legato,
480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973) (heroin discovered in search of package for
explosives); People v. Dooley, 134 Cal. Rptr. 573 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(narcotics discovered in checked luggage after anonymous call that bomb was
on plane was received); Shapiro v. State, 390 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1980) (drugs
found during pre-boarding security search); State v. David, 204 S.E.2d 773
(Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (firearm set off metal detector); People v. Brown, 493
N.Y.S.2d 810 (App. Div. 1985) (gun seen in x-ray of briefcase). But cf. United
States v. $ 124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1989) (currency
found in illegal search at destination, security justification no longer valid).
224. Some early decisions relied on consent as a theory to uphold
searches. See supra note 171.
225. The same would seem applicable to drug testing. One of the major
points of a drug-testing program is that people subject to the program will
avoid using drugs. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607-09; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
666 (―The purposes of the program are to deter drug use among those eligible
for promotion to sensitive positions with the [Customs] Service and to
prevent the promotion of drug users to those programs.‖).
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evidence of criminal activity. The objective of FISA searches is
to locate proof of foreign espionage or terrorism, which means
that the objective is to discover what is usually also evidence of
a crime. It asks too much of agents to distinguish between the
―objects‖ to that degree, at least in the absence of clearly
defined responsibilities and a wall or something like it. It
would be as if Transportation Security Agents were told to look
primarily for drugs or counterfeit money, but then expected to
justify their searches as based on protecting airplanes and
passengers.
More significantly, it is the measure of success that is most
revealing of the difference in nature between special needs and
FISA searches for criminal evidence. Air security searches are
effective largely because by announcing their existence, they
prevent most hijackings. The overriding purpose of air safety
is served, but it is essentially at the disservice of law
enforcement. On the other hand, if passengers and baggage
were secretly screened, it is likely that far more evidence of
crime would be discovered.226 But the ―special need‖ of air
safety, and the reasonableness of airport security searches
under the Fourth Amendment, depends on openness. The fact
that national security searches cannot realistically be
conducted in the open reveals that the special needs model does
not fit very well to justify foreign intelligence searches, even
where that is the only purpose.
2. The Extraordinarily Secretive Nature of FISA Searches
In contrast, FISA searches are not just conducted without
fanfare in a public arena; they are far more secret than is
otherwise tolerated under the Fourth Amendment. Unlike
physical law enforcement searches, special needs intrusions, or
even Title III electronic surveillance, notice is almost always
non-existent or interminably delayed. FISA requires notice to
a subject of electronic surveillance only when the government
intends to use evidence from that surveillance in a criminal

226. Perhaps air security would be served as well as at present. The
answer would probably turn on whether the screening was sufficiently
effective to prevent what would in all likelihood be a greater number of air
piracy attempts.
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prosecution.227 This may occur years after the electronic
surveillance was conducted, or it may never occur. Notice of
FISA physical searches228 is provided only when the residence
of a U.S. person is searched, and then, only after the Attorney
General ―determines there is no national security interest in
continuing to maintain the secrecy of the search.‖229 In
contrast, Title III requires that notice of electronic surveillance
be provided within a reasonable time after the end of the
surveillance, with a statutory default rule of ninety days after
the surveillance ends.230 The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide that at the conclusion of a physical search,
government officers are required to give to a person on the
premises (or leave at empty premises) a copy of the search
warrant and a receipt for all items taken.231 The delays and
denials of notice under FISA are understandable, even
necessary,
in
many
legitimate
foreign
intelligence
investigations. But they seriously undercut any notion that
such action is reasonable in what is primarily, or even
significantly, a criminal investigation.
The nature of surreptitious physical searches underlines
this point. Such searches were virtually unknown until they
were used in connection with the installation of oral
interception devices—radio
transmitters—for
electronic
surveillance of face-to-face meetings. When approved in that
setting, rigid restrictions were imposed to ensure that the
secret entry onto private property was not used as an
opportunity to search for evidence or even domestic intelligence
information.232 The law remained in that state until the 1995
amendment of FISA to allow surreptitious physical searches.
227. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2006) provides in pertinent part: ―Whenever
the Government intends to enter into evidence . . . against an aggrieved
person, any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of
that aggrieved person pursuant to the authority of this subchapter, the
Government shall, prior to the trial . . . notify the aggrieved person and the
court or other authority . . . .‖ The text makes clear that the evidence could
be used in a variety of settings, including state cases. See id. § 1806(d).
228. See supra Part I(B)(3).
229. 50 U.S.C. § 1825(b).
230. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2006).
231. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1).
232. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (upholding
surreptitious entry order issued in connection with a Title III oral
interception order).
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Under FISA, searches of private homes may be conducted
repeatedly for weeks or months without any judicial finding of
probable cause, something that is unimaginable under
traditional Fourth Amendment law.233
Such secrecy alone would probably not be sufficient to
render the loose strictures on foreign intelligence electronic
surveillance and physical searches unconstitutional, but it is a
factor that weighs heavily in that direction. Without timely
notice, there is a much greater intrusion on privacy; with
repeated secret entries, there is a much greater intrusion on
privacy. Considering these factors, along with others such as
the severe restrictions on judicial review, this greater intrusion
requires a concomitantly greater justification. It cannot be
satisfied by the standards of FISA or other laws that require
only a lesser justification.
3. The Problem of Minimal Judicial Review
Many, if not all, of these problems could be remedied by
meaningful judicial review. Such review is lacking in FISA.
Judicial review purportedly occurs in two settings. First, it
233. Section 213 of the USA-PATRIOT Act amended Section 3103a of
Title 18 of the U.S. Code to allow for ―delayed notice,‖ formal statutory
authority for surreptitious physical searches, in all criminal cases—not just
those involving foreign intelligence. United and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, § 213, 115 Stat. 272,
285-286 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3103a). At least prior to that
statute, such ―sneak and peak‖ searches were far more limited and subject to
more judicial oversight than FISA surreptitious entry searches. See, e.g.,
United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986).
We take this position because surreptitious searches and
seizures of intangibles strike at the very heart of the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. The mere
thought of strangers walking through and visually
examining the center of our privacy interest, our home,
arouses our passion for freedom as does nothing else. That
passion, the true source of the Fourth Amendment demands
that surreptitious entries be closely circumscribed. The
warrants in this case failed to do so.
Id. See also United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336-38 (2d Cir. 1990)
(imposing a good cause requirement for delaying notice of electronic
surveillance).
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occurs in the initial authorization of the FISA order. Second, it
occurs in litigation in which FISA searches are challenged,
most commonly through motions to suppress FISA-based
evidence. Yet the judicial role in authorization is limited in
several respects. First, as noted above, FISA permits electronic
surveillance in the United States in several settings without
Section 102 of FISA allows
any judicial role at all.234
warrantless electronic surveillance of non-U.S. persons for as
long as one year.235 Another provision provides for electronic
surveillance without prior judicial authorization in an
emergency situation.236 The Bush Administration reportedly
found this provision too burdensome and therefore sought
additional powers to conduct warrantless electronic
surveillance and apparently conducted such electronic
surveillance outside of FISA on its own reading of
constitutional law.237 FISA similarly allows physical searches
for up to one year on authorization of the Attorney General
under similar standards.238
Judicial review of FISA applications is also highly limited.
Courts simply do not make the sort of decisions they make in
criminal cases. Rather, they serve largely as receivers of
certifications from the government, such as the certification
that a significant purpose of the action is foreign intelligence.239
234. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
235. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §
102(a)(1), 92 Stat. 1783, 1786 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2006)).
236. Id. § 105(e), 92 Stat. at 1791-1792 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)
(2006)). The section provides in pertinent part that: ―[W]hen the Attorney
General reasonably determines that . . . an emergency situation exists . . . he
may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance . . . .‖ Id.
The government must notify a judge and seek judicial approval after the fact.
See id.
237. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1 (first report of electronic
surveillance outside of FISA). See also Anushka Asthana & Karen DeYoung,
Bush Calls For Greater Wiretap Authority, WASH. POST., Sept. 8, 2006, at A1;
Scott Shane & Eric Lichtblau, Cheney Pushed U.S. to Widen Eavesdropping,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, at A1.
238. The general authority to engage in warrantless searches is limited
to situations in which it is unlikely that U.S. citizens will be subject to the
search. 50 U.S.C. § 1822(a) (2006). The emergency search authority is
almost the same as the emergency electronic surveillance provision. Id. §
1824(e).
239. See id. § 1804(a) (listing the certifications from the Department of
Justice); id. § 1805(a) (providing that the court must find that the application
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The only probable cause requirements are that the target is a
foreign power (or an agent of a foreign power) and that the
facilities are used by such person or agent.240 The FISC is not
required to find probable cause that the electronic surveillance
or search will result in acquisition of foreign intelligence
information.241 This, of course, is a far lower standard than the
applicable test in criminal investigations.242 The judicial
approval process is little more than judicial recordkeeping of an
executive branch fishing expedition. That may be fine for a
true foreign intelligence investigation, but it is not sufficient
judicial involvement where the primary purpose of the
government‘s action is to secure evidence for a criminal
prosecution.
These limitations on the judicial role in the authorization
process might be less of a problem if a judge could fully
consider the relevant facts behind an application (or a
warrantless search) in the context of later litigation. In other
words, if a court had to retroactively decide if in fact there was
probable cause to support a search or seizure, the search might
be reasonable. FISA provides, however, that the role of the
trial judge is more limited. The judge‘s only role is essentially
to see that the paperwork underlying the search was in
order.243
The key factor making judicial review at this stage fairly
shallow is Section 1806(f) of Title 50 of the U.S. Code, which
prevents disclosure of FISA documents and requires ex parte
review in most cases.244 The history of FISA suppression
contains all statements and certifications required by § 1804).
240. Id. § 1805(a)(2).
241. Numerous reported cases explain the relative roles of the
Department of Justice and the FISC in authorizing electronic surveillance.
See, e.g., United States v. Amawi, 531 F. Supp. 2d 832, 834-37 (N.D. Ohio
2008); United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982, 986 (D. Minn. 2008);
United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-04 (D. Conn. 2008).
242. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-39 (1983) (fair
probability that evidence will be discovered). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3 (5th ed. 2009).
243. There is no evaluation of the probable cause of a crime or other
textual requirements of the Fourth Amendment, such as reasonable
descriptions of the places and items in question. With respect to the key
question of probable cause, the only judicial role is in the authorization
process, where the judge issuing the order must conclude, in the case of a
U.S. person, that the certifications are not clearly erroneous. § 1805(a).
244. Section 1806(f) is a long and complex provision that seems to
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hearings reveals that the Department of Justice always files an
affidavit stating that national security requires FISA
documents remain under seal, that courts always honor these
requests, and that the resulting judicial evaluations are
ritualistic. For example, in United States v. Mubayyid, the
court stated:
It is of course true that the legality of the
surveillance and search would be better tested
through the adversarial process; an ex parte
review is not a perfect substitute for that process.
The question under the statute, however, is not
how to optimize the legal review of the
surveillance and search, but whether disclosure
is ―necessary‖ in order to make that
determination.245
The court then addressed the validity of foreign intelligence
electronic surveillance in what seems to be a complex federal
income tax case, without revealing who, when, where, how
often, how long, why, or on what basis the government acted,
all in approximately the space of one Federal Supplement page
that contained little but ipse dixit conclusions.246 What little
we know of government errors in the FISA process comes from
provide for in camera ex parte review by the court when the government files
an affidavit explaining that disclosure, even to the attorneys, would harm
national security. Id. § 1806(f). In fact, such affidavits appear to have been
filed in all cases, and ex parte review has always resulted in judicial approval.
In other areas of law, national security concerns have been alleviated through
careful practices, such as those provided in the Classified Information
Procedures Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3, §§1-16 (2006)). See, e.g., United States v. Aref,
533 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1582.
245. United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 (D. Mass.
2007).
246. Id. at 131-32. Numerous courts have upheld electronic surveillance
after limited ex parte hearings, or else refused to allow disclosure to the
defense. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa,
552 F.3d 157, 165-67 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 2010 WL 58776 (U.S. Jan.
11, 2010); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299 (D. Conn. 2008);
United States v. Amawi, 531 F. Supp. 2d 832 (N.D. Ohio 2008); United States
v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Minn. 2008); United States v. Rosen,
447 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Va. 2006). But cf. El-Masri v. United States, 479
F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (dismissal of civil action
under Bivens dismissed due to state secrets privilege).
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All Matters, where the FISC noted that there had been
―misstatements and omissions of material facts‖ in seventy-five
FISA applications, some of which apparently involved
intentional misstatements.247 It seems likely that even more
would be discovered in the adversary system generally required
for criminal litigation. As it happens, however, the government
is allowed to conduct foreign intelligence electronic surveillance
under the honor system. It is no wonder that the government
prefers to follow FISA rather than Title III in investigations
that are primarily criminal in nature.
This minimal judicial role greatly detracts from the
reasonableness of the statutory scheme for foreign intelligence
searches. It is possible, though far from certain, that such
formalistic judicial review is constitutional where the primary
purpose of the government‘s action is to seek foreign
intelligence. That, at least, was Congress‘s intent in enacting
FISA. Where, however, the government leaves the legitimate
special needs category of foreign intelligence to conduct a
search primarily for law enforcement purposes, it is important
that the Fourth Amendment not be applied through the very
generous lens of foreign intelligence.
4.

The Expansion of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction of
International and Terrorism Crimes

The Federal Government has increasingly used criminal
prosecutions as a vehicle for fighting terrorism. At the time of
FISA‘s enactment, the prevailing notion of the crimes
committed by foreign powers was espionage. It is no accident
that most of the criminal cases resulting from this era were
essentially espionage cases in which successful foreign
intelligence electronic surveillance provided evidence that one
or more persons were involved in spying on this country.248
Over roughly the last thirty years, however, Congress has
247. In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620-21 (FISA Ct. 2002). See supra notes 134-36
and accompanying text. Although the court‘s order was overturned on
appeal, nothing in the FISCR‘s decision questioned the accuracy of the FISC‘s
findings on this point.
248. See, e.g., Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980) (Vietnamese spies);
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974) (Soviet spies).
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enacted a number of statutes that expanded criminal liability
for engaging in terrorist activities, expanded criminal law
jurisdiction to include extraterritorial actions, and, of course,
authorized greater use of investigative techniques to prevent
and punish terrorism.249 A short history of major legislation of
the post-FISA period includes enactment of the offense of
Hostage Taking as part of an omnibus crime bill,250 the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986,251
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 252
and, of course, the USA-PATRIOT Act.253 The 1986 law
expanded federal power abroad, largely to protect diplomatic
personnel and facilities, but it also expanded federal criminal
jurisdiction by making it a United States crime to engage in
terrorist actions abroad that harm U.S. nationals. That law
included a provision that made it unlawful to ―kill[ ] a national
of the United States, while such national is outside the United
States.‖254 This has the effect of allowing federal criminal
prosecutions for murder or manslaughter that occurs abroad,
where terrorists kill U.S. citizens. Abu-Jihaad was charged
with violating this law.255 The 1996 law contained a number of
provisions directed at terrorist activities. It significantly added
to substantive federal criminal law by including the crime of
249. Some actions occurred earlier. Air piracy became a crime with the
Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 410, amended by
Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1241 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §
46502 (2006)). This is consistent with the rash of airplane hijackings of the
period.
250. Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage
Taking, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2002, 98 Stat. 1837, 2186 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006)).
251. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
252. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
253. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823).
254. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, §
1202, 100 Stat. at 896 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a) (2006)).
255. Indictment, supra note 1, at ¶ 29. Mayfield was apparently
arrested as a material witness to terrorism offenses in Spain. See Mayfield v.
United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1026-29 (D. Or. 2007), vacated, 588 F.3d
1252 (9th Cir. 2009).
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―providing material support for terrorist organizations.‖256
Professor Norman Abrams points out that ―most of the
prosecutions initiated since September 11, 2001 have involved
offenses and related provisions enacted in the 1996 Act.‖257
The emphasis of the USA-PATRIOT Act, on the other
hand, was in expanding investigative powers and techniques.
In addition to allowing the use of FISA for investigations in
which foreign intelligence is a significant, but not primary,
purpose, the law included provisions that eased restrictions on
the use of pen registers and access to internet
communications,258 loosened grand jury secrecy in the foreign
intelligence area,259 and expanded the scope of subpoenas for
records and tangible evidence.260 Other laws, including a series
of laws intended to permit greater executive use of electronic
256. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 323, 110
Stat. at 1255, amending Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 120005(a), 108 Stat. 1796,
2022 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006)). The provision
provides, in pertinent part, that ―[w]hoever provides material support or
resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of
material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used
in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of [numerous sabotage and
terrorism-related offenses].‖ § 2339A(a). See also id. § 2339B (2006)
(Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizations).
257. NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 10
(3d ed. 2008). This book contains an extended and informative discussion of
federal legislative efforts during this period. See id. at 6-48. Well-known
prosecutions for these offenses include United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d
316 (4th Cir. 2004) (money laundering and material support conviction
related to Hizballah); United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (prosecution of New York criminal defense attorney Lynne Stewart for
passing messages to and from convicted terrorist leader); Indictment, United
States v. Lindh, No. CR 02-37-A (E.D. Va. Feb. 2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/lindh/uswlindh020502cmp.html.
258. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, §
214, 115 Stat. at 286 (codified as amended at §§ 1842-1843 (2006)) (Pen
Registers and Trap and Trace Authority Under FISA); id. § 215, 115 Stat. at
287-88 (codified as amended at § 1861 (2006)) (Access to Certain Business
Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism Investigations).
259. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D) (Authority to Share Criminal
Investigative Information).
260. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, §
210, 115 Stat. at 283 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006)) (Scope
of Subpoenas for Electronic Communications); id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287-88
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006)).
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surveillance, have been passed since 2001.261 These and other
statutes have provided various legal tools, such as executive
orders, to designate organizations as terrorist organizations
and to freeze assets of such groups.262
Before this great expansion of both federal criminal
jurisdiction and civil and criminal vehicles for fighting
terrorism, it was reasonable to think of foreign intelligence as
primarily directed to international politics, diplomacy, and war,
with criminal prosecution an ancillary part of the government‘s
efforts against foreign espionage and terrorism. Now criminal
prosecution is clearly a major part of a very big toolbox. The
cost of making criminal prosecution such a central part of the
government‘s efforts in this area is that, where prosecution
rather than intelligence-gathering is the primary purpose of
electronic surveillance or physical searches, it may well be that
the government has to follow the procedures laid down by the
Constitution for the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases.
5.

FISA Searches are Extremely Intrusive, Especially
Compared to most Special Needs Searches

No one can doubt that the electronic surveillance and
physical searches authorized by FISA are extremely intrusive
on personal privacy.
Electronic surveillance has been
recognized as among the most invasive of government
investigative techniques since Berger v. New York,263 where the
Court stated: ―Few threats to liberty exist which are greater
than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices.‖264 The
Court was equally clear in Keith:
261. See, e.g., USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.); Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121
Stat. 552 (to be codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.); Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
262. See, e.g., Chai v. Dep‘t of State, 466 F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(reviewing Secretary of State‘s order designating organization as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization); Global Relief Found. v. O‘Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th
Cir. 2002) (reviewing Secretary of Treasury‘s order freezing assets).
263. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
264. Id. at 63.
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There is, understandably, a deep-seated
uneasiness
and
apprehension
that
this
[electronic surveillance] capability will be used to
intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding
citizens.
We look to the Bill of Rights to
safeguard this privacy. Though physical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed, its
broader spirit now shields private speech from
unreasonable surveillance.265
Interceptions of telephone conversations or face-to-face
meetings, and physical invasions of a person‘s home, even with
a warrant, are frightening and degrading and a strong reason
for the prominence of the Fourth Amendment in constitutional
text and history.
Two additional aspects of FISA searches illustrate the fact
that their impact is unmatched among generally lawful
intelligence-gathering activities. First, the lack of a criminal
probable cause requirement opens the door to government
action based on general notions of subversion, disloyalty, or
vocal policy disagreement. It is for this reason that FISA
explicitly provides that ―no United States person may be
considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely
upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to
the Constitution of the United States.‖266 While this should
help protect many within the class of U.S. persons, the need to
include it proves the potential threat to liberties. Here again
the Keith Court was direct:
Official surveillance, whether its purpose be
criminal investigation or ongoing intelligence
gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally
protected privacy of speech.
Security
surveillances are especially sensitive because of
265. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 312-13 (1972).
266. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §
105, 92 Stat. 1783, 1790 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (2006)).
See Kreimer, supra note 28 (concerning the extent to which political views
have affected surveillance targeting in the past).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20

60

680

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

the inherent vagueness of the domestic security
concept, the necessarily broad and continuing
nature of intelligence gathering, and the
temptation to utilize such surveillances to
oversee political dissent.267
Second, FISA searches are exceptionally lengthy. Electronic
surveillance can be authorized for a year, and extensions are
possible;268 the same authorization periods apply even to
physical searches.269 In contrast, electronic surveillance orders
in criminal investigations can only be valid for up to thirty
days.270 Under typical search law, a physical search occurs
once, within fourteen days of the issuance of the search
warrant.271
The question of surreptitious searches raises other
questions that arise only in rare and extreme criminal cases. A
search authorization for ninety days, without notice at that
time to the owner or occupant, and without the purpose of
seizing tangible evidence, is obviously an authorization for one
or more secret searches. Secret searches are by definition more
intrusive on personal freedom and security than even a fullscale item-by-item police search. The fear of being subject to
such continued violations, and the possibility of learning about
them only months or years after the fact, are unquestionably
severe invasions of Fourth Amendment interests.272 The facts
of Mayfield illustrate some aspects of the intrusion on both his
rights and those of his family:
The family‘s most intimate conversations were
recorded. They were followed. When the FBI
267. Keith, 407 U.S. at 320.
268. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, § 102(a)(1), 92
Stat. at 1786 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2006)) (concerning
warrantless orders). See also id. § 105(d)(2), 92 Stat. at 1790 (current version
at § 1805(d)(2)) (concerning court orders).
269. See 50 U.S.C. § 1822(a)(1) (2006). See also § 1824(d)(2).
270. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006).
271. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(i).
272. See generally Robert Duncan, Surreptitious Search Warrants and
the USA Patriot Act: “Thinking Outside the Box But Within the Constitution,”
or a Violation of Fourth Amendment Protections?, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 1
(2004).
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thought the Mayfields were not at home or at
work, FBI agents on multiple occasions
surreptitiously entered their house and law
office, looking at and copying their personal and
private documents, legal files and computer hard
drives. The government admits that over 300
photographs were taken inside the Mayfield
home, and additional photographs inside Mr.
Mayfield‘s law office.273
The intrusive effect of FISA electronic surveillance and
searches is in stark contrast to the sort of intrusion permitted
in most special needs cases. As Professor Dressler notes, police
officers rarely conduct special needs searches; instead it is
usually civilian, non-law-enforcement employees, who lack the
intimidating appearance of armed officers.274 Courts upholding
special needs searches often stress that the search was not
excessively intrusive,275 or involved only a minimal privacy
interest.276 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
that a search was reasonable in part because it was short in
duration.277 Special needs searches are often very limited,
looking only for specific items, thus the searches are closely
tailored to fit that special need. The attempt to expand the
special need of foreign intelligence to encompass searches
primarily directed to law enforcement completely undercuts the
principle, and therefore undercuts this rationale for exemption
from standard Fourth Amendment requirements.

273. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff‘s Motion For Summary
Judgment, Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007) (No.
CV-04-1427-AA), 2007 WL 834254, at *1. Although this was the plaintiff‘s
memorandum, these matters were in the stipulation of facts between
Mayfield and the government.
274. JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 328 (4th ed. 2006).
275. See, e.g., O‘Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987).
276. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives‘ Ass‘n, 489 U.S. 602, 62426 (1989).
277. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004); Mich. Dep‘t of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452 (1990); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976).
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6. The Hardship to the Government is Largely Illusory
The implication, by those who support the USA-PATRIOT
Act‘s expansion of FISA, is that modification was necessary in
order to allow intelligence officers to ―connect the dots.‖278 This
claim does not withstand analysis. No one has suggested, let
alone proved, that appropriate foreign intelligence actions were
prevented by the primary purpose requirement or the wall that
the Department of Justice developed to show that its FISA
investigations were in fact motivated by foreign intelligence
objectives. Statistics indicate that FISA orders have increased
somewhat over the last decade,279 but there is no reason to
believe that this results from use of FISA for what are
primarily criminal investigations. Logic suggests that the
increased use of FISA has resulted largely from the increased
human and material resources devoted to the war on terrorism
after the September 11 attacks. Unless and until anyone can
prove that worthwhile foreign intelligence investigations had to
be derailed due to the primary purpose requirement, it is hard
to give credence to claims that the requirement imposes a
serious burden on legitimate intelligence investigations.280 In
fact, if the intelligence officials were making good choices about
targets, and government attorneys were reasonably
interpreting FISA and the Fourth Amendment, the only FISA
searches that should have been prevented by the primary
278. See, e.g., ASHCROFT, supra note 24, at 144-56 (criticisms of the wall).
279. Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 152.
280. The only specific example of such an occurrence in the large body of
writing on intelligence matters over the last several decades does not provide
much support. Victoria Toensing, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in
the President Reagan Justice Department, has written that she terminated a
FISA wiretap during an air hijacking on advice from career attorneys. The
attorneys were apparently concerned that remaining on a wiretap of
associates of the hijackers prevented the tap from being primarily for foreign
intelligence purposes. See Kris, supra note 112, at 501. Putting aside the
fact that this decision took place long before the sorts of rigid procedures
derided as ―the wall,‖ it reveals only bad lawyering by political and career
Justice Department attorneys. An otherwise legitimate foreign intelligence
wiretap that provides information helpful in ending a terrorist event is selfevidently a foreign intelligence wiretap. The intention and use are both to
learn about and resolve a terrorist event—plainly an intelligence purpose.
The use of information in the resulting criminal prosecutions is the sort of
secondary use of information anticipated by FISA and the courts that have
considered criminal cases using FISA evidence.
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purpose requirement would be those primarily directed at
collecting evidence against U.S. persons for criminal
prosecution. Unless we change the Fourth Amendment, our
system treats that as a tolerable burden.281
In the end, that is what the Special Needs Doctrine seems
to be about. The policies underlying programmatic searches,
from drug tests to D.U.I. roadblocks to foreign intelligence
electronic surveillance, are debatable and require legislative
rather than judicial oversight. If those policies are sufficiently
compelling, and the burdens on individuals comparatively
light, it makes sense for courts not to bring into play the full
panoply of Fourth Amendment requirements. But the cost to
the public of the government obtaining search and seizure
powers without meeting those requirements is that it must
avoid conducting its criminal investigations using those
enhanced foreign intelligence powers.
If the price of robust powers to protect the nation is that
the government bend over backwards to avoid using criminal
law remedies, it is a price worth paying. There are many
examples of governments having to forego criminal
prosecutions because of choices made at the investigative stage.
Some involve typical criminal justice system actions, such as
grants of immunity. Others, more applicable to the current
international scene, result from government actions that
include overly aggressive tactics, such as harsh interrogations,
in which the resulting evidence may be inadmissible in court.
Sometimes criminal cases are quashed because of other legal or
political realities, such as where Diplomatic or Consular
Immunity prevents prosecution, or spies are traded back to
their own nations. Insisting on the legality of electronic
surveillance without probable cause, and in some cases without
281. In the end, this is not really much about the exclusionary rule.
Whether courts decide to permit or exclude evidence obtained for criminal
cases is largely beside the point. As in most other special needs settings, the
real issue is the extent to which the government may engage in searches or
seizures, and the underlying question is the permissibility of the program,
rather than the treatment of the resulting evidence. If the government
follows the primary purpose test, as it presumably did from 1978 to 2001,
however, there would not even be a question about the admissibility of the
resulting evidence because doctrines such as the Plain View doctrine, see
discussion supra notes 189-93, and cases such as Illinois v. Lidster, 504 U.S.
419 (2004), see supra note 214, plainly allow the use in criminal prosecutions
of evidence obtained in special needs cases.
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warrants, in order to achieve criminal law enforcement
purposes runs the real risk that the techniques will be marked
off-limits, even for intelligence purposes, because it can no
longer be stated with confidence that the searches are
reasonable, special needs searches.
The wall, as developed over several presidential
administrations and as revised by the FISC in 2002, really
served to enhance government power. Its existence allowed the
intelligence agencies to operate, confident that they could prove
that their investigations were motivated by the need for foreign
intelligence. At the same time it allowed the Department of
Justice to use the results of FISA searches in criminal
prosecutions. In a sense, the wall allowed the government to
prove that its foreign intelligence searches were in fact special
needs searches. It cannot do so today.
V. Conclusion: The New Paradigm and the Limits of Precedent
One year into the Obama Administration, there is no
indication that the Department of Justice has ended John
Ashcroft‘s New Paradigm. Apparently, we can expect the
Department to continue to emphasize prevention of terrorism
over the prosecution of crime. Since the government is still
likely to move aggressively against international terrorists in
federal criminal prosecutions, the dual purpose foreign
intelligence/law enforcement search is likely to be with us for
some time.
As long as intelligence and prevention are the first objects
of the Department, there must be some workable set of rules to
make sure that the New Paradigm does not obliterate the
probable cause and warrant requirements—the default settings
of the Fourth Amendment. It is not acceptable to adopt a pure
―reasonableness‖ requirement and then to rubber stamp as
reasonable each and every intrusion that seems to serve shortterm needs. The lightweight version of the Fourth Amendment
contemplated by the Special Needs and other various doctrines,
which allow very intrusive searches without the traditional
protections of the Fourth Amendment, are controversial
enough in their own right and are plainly inadequate when
purposely used to enforce criminal law. The ―special needs‖
Fourth Amendment exists only because it is outside the
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criminal law system. Its application in the criminal law system
is thus a serious error of constitutional criminal procedure and
a potential disruption of the complex set of doctrines that have
grown up to permit government searches in appropriate noncriminal cases. The wild card of the ―significant purpose‖ rule
is as likely to result in a narrowing of foreign intelligence
powers or, more generally, in special needs authority, as it is to
result in approving enhanced authority to search in quasicriminal matters.
Despite the bromides directed at the wall‘s arguable effect
of shutting down some intelligence sources, it has largely
served to keep the criminal justice system out of the way of the
intelligence gathering system, and vice versa. To take the
anecdotal example of the unwillingness of the FBI to share
data concerning flight training by suspected terrorists before
the September 11 attacks, is it really likely that such obviously
pertinent intelligence information was somehow kept from
intelligence officers by the wall?
The information was
intelligence, not criminal evidence. It only became criminal
evidence after the intelligence system failed and there was a
crime to investigate. If the information had been shared there
might never have been September 11 attacks, and if they had
still occurred, the use of intelligence information in any
resulting criminal prosecution would be patently lawful. Any
dot-connecting flaws were due to the lack of coordination
within the intelligence community.282 No problems resulted
from applying the Fourth Amendment‘s requirements to those
investigations in which law enforcement, rather than foreign

282. Stated differently, the wall should not be blamed for the failure of
government officials to implement it effectively. The recent history of the
period reveals that inadequate resources were provided to the agencies, the
data management was mid-20th century, and good-old bureaucratic turf
protection was in full force. In the wake of the September 11 attacks,
Attorney General Ashcroft identified a lack of political will and inadequate
technology as major causes. ASHCROFT, supra note 24, at 244. The failure to
share information competently within intelligence agencies remains a critical
problem, as revealed by the events leading up to the attempted Christmas
2009 ―underwear‖ bombing. See Peter Baker & Carl Hulse, Obama Hears of
Signs that Should have Grounded Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at A1;
Karen DeYoung, Bombing Reports Start Trickling In to Obama, WASH. POST,
Dec. 30, 2009, at A3; Doyle McManus, Op-Ed., Another Failure to
Communicate, 9/11 was Supposed to be a Wake-Up Call For U.S. Intelligence
Agencies. Nope., L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at 26.
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intelligence, was the dominant purpose.283
In the end, the problem of using investigative techniques
against potential terrorists to obtain foreign intelligence and to
collect evidence of crimes illustrates one of those law school
conundrums—the limits of building logically on precedent.
Here, it is possible to take several minor steps and see them
lead fairly clearly in the direction of allowing the use of broad
and largely unregulated tactics against potential sources of
foreign intelligence in order to obtain evidence that would be
useful and probably admissible in criminal prosecutions. This
is what the FISCR did when it concluded in 2002 that the
Special Needs Doctrine allowed such searches. The logical
components, however, lead to an illogical conclusion. In fact,
the minor steps obscure that the fundamental requirement is
reasonableness, and what is reasonable can depend on a
number of factors, not just to the extent it furthers the goal of
foreign intelligence.
The reasonableness ―totality of the circumstances‖ test has
long been a central part of Fourth Amendment law, and by
definition, serves to prevent abstract theories from building up
a superstructure that ignores context, impact, and the practical
aspects of both intelligence and criminal investigations. In a
sense, this is the message of City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.284
If the purpose of the investigation is something other than law
enforcement, then application of traditional law enforcement
aspects of the Fourth Amendment seems beside the point.
Instead, courts seek a common sense accommodation of the
competing interests and apply it to the intrusion. But where
there is a significant law enforcement purpose, traditional
rules must apply. Otherwise, there would be no limits to
mandatory drug tests, roadblocks, and presumably house-tohouse and car-to-car searches—all for any of a number of
combined law enforcement and ―special needs‖ purposes. The
attempt in the USA-PATRIOT Act to end-run these principles
by allowing extremely aggressive searches where a
283. And even if they were, we would all be happier now if the officials
in question had recognized that the national security interest was in fact
dominant, disclosed the information as required by public safety, and let the
chips fall where they may.
284. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). See supra
notes 200-14 and accompanying text.
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―significant‖ purpose is foreign intelligence simply turns
Edmond on its head. It purports to allow a secondary or
tertiary intelligence purpose to override the dominant law
enforcement purpose in many cases. On top of that, it allows
the most intrusive sorts of searches, and those that are most
likely to turn up evidence of crimes. We do not know how
many FISA searches or other intelligence investigations are
flawed in this fashion. It may be very few, which would
support the argument that returning to the wall and the
primary purpose requirement would cause little disruption to
national security. It may be more than a few, which would
support the argument that greater care should be taken to
ensure that the government is not permitted to get around the
Fourth Amendment in criminal cases by invoking the deus ex
machina of foreign intelligence. The wall, with its insistence
that foreign intelligence searches be justified by foreign
intelligence justifications, protects us and still allows
appropriate government searches to continue.
But I hold no confidence in the power or the will of most
courts to insist that the government turn square corners in this
respect. The political pressure to do nothing that appears to
make intelligence-gathering or criminal prosecution more
difficult is seemingly too much to resist, apparently even for
judges with lifetime tenure, and even where the added burden
on intelligence investigations is almost entirely ephemeral.
The Supreme Court of 1973, which decided Keith, however,
would not have allowed this to occur. Perhaps someday,
especially if the present Supreme Court stays out of this
controversy and issues no binding precedents, future judges
will recognize that the central meaning of the Special Needs
Doctrine, along with statutory requirements such as
minimization rules, provide an authoritative path to
maintaining as much separation between foreign intelligence
and criminal investigations as is feasible.
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